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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 1 requires drug

and medical device manufacrurers to investigate and report to the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) incidents involving their
products, even though personal injuries may not have resulted.2 After
the necessary reports are filed, third parties may seek discovery of the

reports under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)3 or directly from
the manufacturer if litigation ensues. Thus, the compliance efforts of a
drug or medical device manufacturer may be used against it by a litigant
in a products liability action. Despite substantial civil and criminal
penalties that may be imposed on drug and medical device manufacturers
failing to report product complaints, malfunctions, or defects,4 wide-
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1. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-95 (1994).
2. See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); see infra notes 157-73, 186-206 and accompanying
text.
4. A drug or device manufacturer that fails to comply with its reporting
requiremencs under the FDCA may be liable for substmtial fines or may be subject to
injunction proceedings, product seizure, denial or withdrawal of marketing approval,
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spread underreporting exists in this area.S primarily due to the specter
of products liability exposure.6
Because the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine are
inadequate to protect the FDA-required internal product-safety analyses
performed by drug and medical device manufacturers,7 commentators
have suggested that the emerging common-law privilege of self-critical
analysis8 is another possible alternative to preserve the confidentiality

recall, or imprisorunerit. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-335c, 355(e), 360e(e), 360f,
360h(o); 21 C.F.R. pt. 7 & §§ 314.80(k), 314.8l(d), 814.45, 814.46 {1996),
5. See Alan C. Miller, Medical Device Defects Held to Go Unreported, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1989, at Al; see also Center for Devices & Radiological Health Home
Page (visited Mar. 5, 1996) <http://www.fda.gov/cdrb/mdrinfo.html>.
6. See Jonathan S. Kahan, Reporting of Substantial Product Hazards Under
Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 30 ADMIN. L. REv. 289, 309 (1978)
(noting that fear of products liability exposure is ''perhaps the most important negative
incentive to reporting"); Timothy D. Zick, Note, Reporting Substantial Product Safety
Hazards Under the Consumer Product Safety Act: The Products Liability Interface, 80
GEO. L.J. 387, 389-90 & nn.9-10, 396 (1991).
7. See infra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
8. The self-critical analysis privilege bas been referred to variously by courts and
commentators as the "self..critica! subjective analysis privilege," e.g., ftt re Burlington
N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 1982); the "self-critical analysis defense," e.g.,
Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.RD. 431,433 (E.D. Pa. 1978); the "critical
seJt:.analysis privilege,'' e.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446,449 (D. Md,
1984), a.ff'd, 785 F. 2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); the "self-criticism privilege," e.g., S. Kay
McNab, Note, Criticizi11g the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 675, 683-88
(1987); the "self-examination privilege," e.g., Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84
F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); the "self-evaluation privilege," e.g., Hoffman v.
United Telecomms., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 442 (D. Kan. 1987); the "self-evaluative
privilege," e.g., Joseph E. Murphy, The Self-Evaluative Privilege, 1 J. CORP. L. 489
(1982); Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, The Self-Evaluative Privilege and
Beyond, INSIOHTS, Mar. 1993, at 11, available in WESTLAW, lnsit Database; John
Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1995); Robert J. Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self
Regulation-11ie Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or
Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 597 (1993); Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F.
Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in
Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate ''Self-Evaluative" Privile1e,
21 AM. CRIM, L. REv. 123 (1983); the "privilege for confidential self-evaluative
analysis," e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.RD. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); the
"self-evaluative report privilege," e.g., Clyde C. Kahrl, Comment, The Attorney-Client
Privileie, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, 40 Omo Sr. L.J. 699 (1979); the "qualified privilege for self-evaluative
documents," e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663,667 (4th Cir. 1977);
the "privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents," e.g., Emerson Elec. Co.
v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 906-07 (8th Cir. 1979); the "self-critical privilege," e.g.,
United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9 (D. Conn. 1990); the "privilege of critical
self-examination," e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, The Privilege of Critical Self-Examination:
How To Raise and Use It, 58 DEF. CoUNS. J. 504, 507 (1991); the "peer review
privilege," e.g., Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 690 (E.D. Cal. 1993); and
the "public policy privilege," e.g. , Lynne Charlotte Hennle, Note, A Bo!Ollced Approach
to Affirmative Action Discovery in Title VII Suits, 32 HAsTINGS L.J. 1013, 1024 (1981).
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of these self-analytical reports. Authors of myriad cases and commentaries over the past twenty-five years have debated the viability of this
evolving, nascent9 privilege. Originating in a medical peer review
context, the privilege modernly has been afplied to corporate self-critical
studies in a variety of different settings. 1
If applied, the self-critical analysis privilege prevents disclosure of
self-evaluative material when the public interest in maintaining
confidentiality outweighs the public's need for full discovery. 11 Ideally,
assertion of the privilege would protect a corporation's internal
investigations and resulting self-analytical reports from discovery, even
though such documents admittedly may be highly relevant to a lawsuit.
Commentators argue that without the privilege, which "is intended to
promote the societal goal of encouraging candid appraisal of problems
as an aid to implementing beneficial cbange,"12 a "chilling effect" on
such self-analyses would result. 13
Despite the privilege's origins over twenty-five years ago and resultant
wide-spread application in the 1970s and 1980s,'4 its evolution has
been impeded by two competing societal interests: a general policy
9.

Numerous courts and commentators have referred to this privilege as "nascent"

See, e.g., Bush, supra note 8, at 602,603; Note, The Privilege ofSelf-Critical Analysis,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (1983} [bereinafter Harvard Note}; Crisman & Mathews,.
supra note 8, at 171; Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct Law Div.

1984).
IO.
11.

See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text
See, e.g., Wylie, 478 A.2d at 1276; Roberts v. National Detroit Corp., 87

F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
12. David J. Beck, What's Happening in the Law: SJUVeying the New Developments, Business Litigation 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 357, 358 (1993).
13. Commentators have referred to a "dual chilling effect" First, corporations
faced with potential litigation and possible punitive damages exposure are less likely to
compile potentially damaging ''paper trails" or ''road maps" for plaintiff's lawyers.
Second, aware that damaging infonnation could lead to reprisals sbould liability result,
individuals within the corporation will be reluctant to be candid without an assurance of
confidentiality. See Harvard Note, supra note 9 at 1091-93; Beck, supra note 12, at 358;
see also Bush, supra note 8 at 634-35, 637; Conway, supra note 8, at 635-37, 657-59;
Paul B. Taylor, Note, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by Applying the Privilege of
Self-Critical Analysis When Punitive Damages are Sought, 16 HARv, J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y
769, 796-97 (1993); James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for
Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 124, 126, 133 (1994); David P.
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I 13,
117 {1988) [hereinafter Leonard, Codijj,ing a Privilege]; Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical
Analysis Privilege and Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENvTL. L. 73, 80 & n.38
(1995).
14. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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favoring the free flow of information and the litigant's right to liberal
discovery. 15 These opposing interests have led to inconsistent applications of the privilege by the courts, which must balance the equities in
each particular case before applying the privilege. 16 The growing trend
by the courts is to construe the self-critical analysis privilege narrowly
either by severely limiting its application or by questioning its existence
and refusing to apply the privilege at all. 17 Such judicial disfavor has
resulted in an inconsistent case-by-case approach, leading to unpredictable outcomes for corporations relying on the privilege to maintain the
confidentiality of their self-analytical documents.
Because of the unsettled nature of this emerging privilege, businesses
and commentators recently have clamored for legislation creating a
qualified statutory privilege for internal self-analyses. 18 While several
model statutes have been proposed, only one state has enacted legislation
that encourages self-critical analysis by product manufacturers, with the
Widerlying goal of encouraging product-safety innovation for consumers'
benefit and protection. 19
Although the self-critical analysis privilege seems especially important
in the drug and medical device industry where product perfonnance is
continually monitored by critical self-evaluation and is crucial to the

15. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1084; Bush, supra note 8, at 603;
Gish, supra note 13, at 77, 80, 75 n.8 ("The competing policy considerations of a
plaintiff's interest in full and complete discovery and a defendant's interest in privacy
and confidentiality have Jong been a source of debate in the Jaw of privileges."); Beck,
supra note 12, at 358-60; David P. Leonard, An Emerging Pn·vilege for Self-Critical
Analysis, 14 LmGATION I, 3 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter Leonard, An Emerging
Privilege].
16. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1087, 1091; Bush, supra note 8, at
607-08; Gish, supra note 13, at 77; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at
3.
17. See infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1085 n.11; Bush, supra note 8, at
641-45; Murphy, supra note 8, at 499-502; Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 15;
Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8, at 172-74; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, suP..ra
note 15, at 58-59; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 15, at 123-25; O'Reilly,
supra note 13, at 141-46 (creating qualified privilege for environmental audits).
19. In perhaps the most aggressive move toward codifying this common-law
privilege, Arizona recently enacted legislation that encourages self-critical analysis for
products manufacturers and forges the path of the privilege away from a discovery
prohibition and toward an evidentiary restriction. Under the Arizona legislation, a
qualified evidentiary privilege prohibits the ultimate admissibility-not the
discoverability--ofself-analyticai product-safety reviews. See ARIZ. REV. STAT,§ 12681 (West 1992); id. § 12-687 (West Supp. 1996); see also John Kaites, Encouraging
Safety Innovation Through Self-Critical Analysis, LEADER'S PRODUCT LIABILl1Y LAW
AND STRATEGY 3 (July 1995).
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preservation of human life,20 that industry is subject to the liberal
public disclosure requirements of the FOIA. Because neither Congress
nor the FDA has exempted product-safety analyses from public
disclosure, it is unlikely that the courts or state legislatures will extend
the privilege to protect such information from discovery by a litigant.
Consequently, drug and medical device manufacturers will not be
released from their current Hobson's choice: comply with the stringent
FDA reporting requirements, or fail to do so in an effort to curtail the
products liability and punitive damages exposure21 resulting from public
disclosure of their product-related safety reports.
This Article analyzes the inapplicability of the self-critical analysis
privilege to the drug and medical device industry. Part II traces the
historical development of the privilege and the increasing judicial
reluctance to expand the privilege beyond the medical peer review
context. Part III outlines the drug and medical device reporting
requirements under the FDCA. Part IV provides an overview of both
the public disclosure requirements under the FOIA and its counterpart
requirements under the FDCA and argues that application of the
privilege to the drug and medical device industry is federally preempted.
Finally, in Part V, the Article concludes that the strong public interests
of liberal discovery and the right to access government records do not
justify expansion of the self-critical analysis privilege to product-safety
analyses submitted to the FDA by the drug and medical device industry.
Il.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE SELF-CRITICAL
ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE

Unlike the well-established and widely recognized attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine, the self-critical analysis privilege
is of relatively recent common-law origin. Although strong precedent
exists for applying this nascent privilege to reviews generated by medical
peer reviews, many courts are hesitant to extend the privilege to other
types of internal self~critical reviews due to the long-standing judicial

20. See James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical
Analyses, 51 GEO, WASH. L. REV, 551,571 (1983).
21. See generally David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. cm. L. REY. l (1982); Taylor,
supra note 13.
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reluctance to recognize any new privilege absent a statute.22 This
reluctance has resulted in inconsistent, ad hoc applications of the
privilege.

A.

Genealogy of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege:
The Attorney-Based Protections

The traditional attorney-based protections-the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine-represent the earliest genealogy of the
self-critical analysis privilege.23 Although certain types of selfanalytical materials may be safeguarded by the attorney-client privilege
or the work-product doctrine, neither offers adequate security because,
in most cases, the information sought does not meet the requirements of
either type of protection.24

1.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

Under the well-established attorney-client privilege,25 confidential
attorney-client communications are absolutely privileged from disclosure.26 Absent this inveterate privilege, full and frank disclosures of all

22. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 131, 148; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall,
850 S.W.2d 155, 162 & n.3 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting) ("(M]ostjurisdictions
exercise judicial restraint by interpreting statutes rather than enacting new privileges.");
Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (App. Div. 1988); Scroggins v.
Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 Qnd. Ct. App. 1987); DeMoss Rexall Drugs
v. Dobson, 540 N.E.2d 655, 657 Qnd. Ct. App. 1989).
23. See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13 ("The work-product concept of
protecting another party's review and analysis, and the attorney-client privilege policy
of encouraging compliance with law, are all roots of this privilege,")
24. See Leonard, Cod(fj,ing a Privilege, supra note 13, at 120-22. See generally
Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8 (discussing limitations of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product doctrine when applied to corporate self-evaluative investigations),
25. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential communications. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2290, at 547 (McNaughton
ed., 3d ed. 1940).
26. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2292, at 558; Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (acknowledging the "longestablished rule that confidential communications between an attorney and his client are
absolutely privileged from disclosure against the will of the client''). The attorney-client
privilege remains a common-law privilege in the federal system. Congress rejected
proposed Rules 502-513 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which contained a specific
provision recognizing the attorney-client privilege. See 10 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 500.03, at V-4 to V-5 (2d ed. 1996); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2020, at 312-13 (2d ed. 1994).
Communications between attorney and client are not privileged, however, where the
advice is sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud. See 4 MOORE, supra, t 26.11 [2],
at26-J88 to 26-190 (2d ed. 1996); WRIGHT ET AL., supra,§ 2017, at 257.
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relevant information between attorney and client would be curtailed.27
This rationale is similar to that underlying the self-critical analysis
privilege.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United States2 8 is
touted as the «seminal articulation" of the corporate attorney-client
privilege.2!> In Upjohn, the Court unanimously rejected a restrictive
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege because such a narrow
reading threatened "to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to
ensure their client's compliance with the law."30 The Court affirmed
the strong public policy underlying the protection of internal corporate
compliance efforts31 when it acknowledged that corporate clients need
to consult lawyers because of the "vast and complicated array of
regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation."32 Similarly,
the fundamental goal underlying the self-critical analysis privilege is to
encourage corporate self-evaluation and self-correction by assuring the
confidentiality of such actions. 33
The attorney-client privilege, however, protects only the confidential
communication itself. Neither the underlying information nor the self27. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'if 26.11[2], at 26-174. The policy underlying the
attorney-client privilege is to encourage a client to be forthright with his or her attorney
without apprehension of compelled disclosure by the attorney. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
is to promote "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice"); see also S WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2291, at 550.
28. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
29. See Bush, supra note 8, at 616.
30. 449 U.S. at 392. In Upjohn, the IRS had attempted to obtain a company-wide
internal review directed by Upjohn's general counsel to investigate whether the company
was involved in making improper payments to foreign government officials.
3 L See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13. As one commentator noted, the
Upjohn decision ''very easily could have become the cornerstone of the critical selfexamination privilege." See Rickerson, supra note 8, at 507.
32. 449 U.S. at 392 (noting that compliance with such legislation ''is hardly an
instinctive matter'').
33. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 496. The Upjohn Court, however, did not
resolve the dilemma llllderlying the self-critical anaJysis privilege: the corporation's
desire to maintain the confidentiality of self-evaluative activities while attempting to
comply with its regulatory agency's need to access such infonnation. See Crisman &
Mathews, supra note 8, at 126. In such cases, the legislature and courts should not
''tinker'' with the traditional attorney-based privileges. "Rather, Congress should focus
directly on whether it should grant corporations a carefully tailored self-evaluative
privilege designed to promote maximum law compliance at minimum cost ...." Id. at
127.
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critical evaluations of a client are protected.34 Additionally, the
privilege does not attach to information obtained by an attorney from
public documents3s or from third parties.36 Another drawback of the
attorney-client privilege in the context of internal corporate evaluations
is that the privilege can be waived easily.37 Even limited disclosure of
otherwise rrivileged information to government agencies may be deemed
a waiver. 3 Moreover, the "veil of secrecy'' imposed by the attorneyclient privilege is not practical with such compliance efforts, which are
primarily educational and motivational.39 Yet another limitation of the

34. See EDWARD w. CLEARY ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 89, at 213-14
(3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK: ON Ev:IDENCE.]; 8 WIOMORE, supra note 25,
§ 2306, at 589-90; 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ,i 26.11[2], at 26-178 to 26-179. See also
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 121; Conway, supra note 8, at 632.
35. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2017, at 266-67. See, e.g., American
Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (D. Del. 1962) (refusing
to extend attorney-client privilege to documents consisting of analyses of patents, claims,
and products manufactured under patents where such infonnation was on file in the
patent office and thus public).
36. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2017, at 266-67. See, e.g., FTC v.
TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d ;207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1980), ajf'g479 F. Supp. 160 (D.D.C. 1979)
(holding attorney-client privilege inapflicable to independent compilation1erfonned by
outside company); Franks v. Nationa Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 23 , 237-38 (D.
Tex. 1966) (refusing to apply attorney-client privilege to report by testing laboratory in
products liability case). But see United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir.
1961) (recognizing attomey-client privilege can attach to accountant's report made at
attorney's request for purpose of translating client's infonnation into usable form for the
attorney); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (according
attorney-client privilege to psychiatrist hired by attorney to aid in preparation of insanity
defense); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding attorneyclient privilege to audit prepared by accountant at attorney's request to aid in advising
client whether to file aniended tax return).
37. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2311, at 600, § 2327, at 630; 4 MOORE,
supra note 26, "ii 26.11(2], at 26-185 to 26-187. A party must zealously protect the
confidentiality of communications with counsel to prevent waiver of the privilege. Even
inadvertent disclosure can result in waiver. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976,
980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (indicating that a party must "treat the confidentiality of attomeyclient communications like jewels-if not crown jewels"),
38. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
voluntary submission to SEC waived privilege); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980-81
(holding voluntary disclosure of document during routine government audit waived
privilege in subsequent action for fraud and tax evasion); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum,
738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding attorney-client privilege waived by voluntary
disclosure of self-evaluative materia1s to SEC); Pennian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine waived by voluntary disclosure of self-evaluative materials to SEC), But see
Donovan v. Teamsters Union Local 25, 103 F.R.D. 550, 553 (D. Mass. 1984) (preserving
privilege where disclosure to government compelled by law).
39. See Mutpby & Oyer, supra note 8, at 13. See, e.g,, FfC v. TRW, Inc., 479
F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.D.C. 1979) (rejecting application of attorney-client privile~e for
an internal compliance review because the findings of the :revie\v "were sufficiently
circulated within TRW as to negate the intention of confidentiality'').
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attorney-client privilege is that it does not apply when the in-house
attorney, who regularly wears several hats, is performing work that
requires management expertise rather than work that requires legal
acumen.40 Nor is it practical or cost-effective to utilize attorneys for
routine compliance efforts.41 And even if an attorney is included in
such efforts, there is no guarantee that the privilege will protect the
evaluative reports from disclosure.42 Consequently, the attorney-client
privilege does not provide reliable protection for mOst self-analytical
documents.

2.

The Work-Product Doctrine

Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine has an
extensive history, tracing its origins to the 1947 Supreme Court decision
in Hickman v. Taylor. 43 The doctrine subsequently was codified in
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 and the
majority of states have adopted identical or substantially similar workproduct statutes.45 The work-product doctrine is not technically a
privilege. Rather, the doctrine offers qualified protection to an attorney's
work product prepared for trial or "in anticipation of litigation."46 Such
protection, however, is not absolute: it may yield where a party seeking
disclosure shows "substantial need" for the information and shows
40. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 26, § 2017, at 260-61; Mmphy, supra note 8,
at 497; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3. See, e.g., Resnick v,
American Dental Ass'n, 95 F,R.D. 372,375 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that the privilege
will not be extended to management-oriented work done for overall business pmposes
performed by an attorney where the attorney-client relationship was only ''tangential" to
the work); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that
privilege did not apply to fact-finding by an attorney retained for that purpose);
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that for
communication to be privileged, it must be made to obtain legal advice from an attorney
retained for that purpose); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2296, at 569.
41. See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 14; O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 136-38;
Murphy, supra note 8, at 497.
42. See Conway, supra note 8, at 632-33; Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp.
367,372 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting claim of attorney-client privilege by corporation that
included attorney to conduct internal audit reports).
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
44. See infra note 47.
45. See WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2023, at 334-35 nn.27-28.
46. See FED. R Crv. P. 26(b)(3). As the Hiclanan Court noted, "[d]iscovery was
hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions ... on wits
borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S. at 516.
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inability to obtain the information elsewhere without suffering "undue
hardship.'"' 7 Furthermore, the requirement that the information be
compiled "in anticipation of litigation" has been interpreted narrowly.48
Reports made in the regular course of business fall outside of the workproduct protection.49
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine has
its shortfalls when applied to self-analytical reports. One of the primary
purposes underlying corporate compliance efforts is to prevent litiga-

47. An attorney's work product may be discovered ''upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery bas substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see also
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. As with the attorney-client privilege, a crime-fraud
exception applies to the work-product doctrine. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ,i
26.15[4], at 26-324 to 26-326.
48. See WRJGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 2024, at 338-43 nn.7-10; 4 MOORE,
supra note 26, '!126.15[2], at 26-296. See, e.g., Martin v. Baily's Park Place Hotel &
Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "anticipation of litigation" test
looks to whether party claiming work-product protection has reasonable unilateral belief
that litigation will ensue); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) ("'[T]he mere fact that litigation does eventually ensue
does not, by itself, cloak materials' with work product immunity•... The document
must be prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual
or a potential claim following an actual event or series of events that reasonably could
result in litigation.'') (emphasis omitted) (quoting Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto
Indus., Inc. 709 F.2d 1109, 118 (7th Cir. 1983)); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'! Corp., 64
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding remote possibility oflitigation is insufficient);
Flores v, Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (holding investigations are not made in anticipation of litigation unless litigation is "imminent''); National
Tanlc Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex. 1993) (holding anticipation of
litigation test met where reasonable person believes there is "a substantial chance of
litigation").
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment)
("Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the
qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.") See, e.g., Sanders v. Alabama State
Bar, 161 F.R.D. 470,473 (D. Ala. 1995) (holding that even where litigation is already
a prospect, documents prepared in regular course of business, rather than for purpose of
litigation, are not privileged under work-product doctrine); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding risk~
management docwnents prepared to keep track of and anticipate costs of products
liability litigation not protected work product); Smith v. Conway Org., Inc., 154 F.R.D.
73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that where a party or its attorney prepares a document
in the ordinary course of business, it will not be protected work product, even if party
believes that document may be useful in the event litigation ensues); Harper v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 662-63 (D. Ind. 1991) (holding a docwnent prepared
by an insurer to evaluate an insured's claim in the ordinary course of business was not
protected work product even if prepared after litigation was reasonably anticipated
because "it is the very nature of an insurer's business to investigate and evaluate the
merits of claims"),
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tion. 50 Thus, while self-critical studies performed at the request of an
attorney for purposes of trial preparation might be protected from
discovery, many routine compliance efforts do not possess the requisite
tie to litigation to invoke work-product protection. Additionally, like the
attorney-client privilege, protection under the work-product doctrine does
not extend to facts that can be ileaned from protected documents,51 and
the protection may be waived.
B.

Common-Law Origins of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

Although the self-critical analysis privilege can trace itS' roots to the
attorney-based protections, courts and scholars have attributed the
common-law origins of the self-critical analysis privilege to a 1970
federal district court opinion.53 In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,54

50.

See Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at 14; see also O'Reilly, supra note 13, at

138-39.

51.

See Hic/anan, 329 U.S. at 511 (1947); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26,

§ 2023, at 330-33, § 2024, at 337.

52. See supra note 38 and accompanying texL See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec.
Litig., 152 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to extend work-product immunity
where corporation's audit committee voluntarily disclosed report to SEq; In re Worlds
of Wonder Sec. Litig., 147 F.R.D. 208, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding work-product
immunity waived by voluntarily producing documents to SEC, even where corporation
expressly reserved all of its rights and submitted the information confidentially), But
because the primary goal of the work-product doctrine is to protect the adversary
process, as opposed to protecting a cJient's confidences, disclosure ofwork product to
a third party does not necessarily waive work-product protection. See 4 MOORE, supra
note 26, "iJ26.15[4], at26-322 to 26-324; WRIGHT ET AL.,supra note 26, § 2024, at 36769.

53.

See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 13, at 799; Bush, supra note 8, at 603; Crisman

& Mathews, supra note 8, at 171-72; Beck, supra note 12, at 358; Harvard Note, supra
note 9, at 1087; Murphy, supra note 8, at 490; Murphy & Oyer, supra note 8, at II;

Jean D. Reed, Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV, 803, 820-21 (1980); Comment, Civil Procedure: SelfEvaluative Reports-A Qualified Privilege in Discovery?, 51 MrnN. L REV. 807, 814
(1973); O'Reiliy,supra note 13, at 148; Zick,supra note 6, at401; Flanagan.supra note
20, at 552 n.8; Gish, supra note 13, at 78; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note
13, at 117; Rickerson, supra note 8, at 505; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc.,
971 F.2d 423,426 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992); Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.RD. 301,306 n.4
(M.D. Ga. 1994); In re Grand Juty Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1994);
FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207,210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Combined Communications
Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); Konrady v.
Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 595 {D. Minn. 1993). But see Leonard, Codifying a
Privilege, supra note 13, at 118 n.15 {noting that others have suggested that the privilege
possibly was first recognized in Richards v. Maine Central Railroad, 21 F.R.D. 593, 594
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the court rejected a medical malpractice plaintiff's request for production
of minutes and reports generated by the defendant hospital's staff
committee meetings. The court noted that the sole objective of those
self-analytical meetings, which were conducted with the expectation of
confidentiality, was the ..improvement in care and treatment of hospital
patients."5s The intent of maintaining confidentiality in the medical
peer review context is to encourage physicians to candidly criticize and
review one another in an atmos.phere that is closed to civil litigants
pursuing malpractice claims against a physician,56 The court emphasized that confidentiality is crucial to ensure the unimpeded flow of this
type of information, thus protecting society's interest in improved health
care and treatment.57 Acknowledging that exposure of these confi.den~
tial and sensitive deliberations to discovery absent "a showing of
exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations,"5s
the Bredice court held that medical peer review meetings are entitled to
a qualified self-critical analysis privilege "on the basis of the overwhelming public interest'' in imp~oving prospective medical care.59

(D. Me. 1957), which protected from discovery in a wrongful death action defendant
railroad's investigatory documents that were required by statute to be filed with the
state's Public Utilities Commission because ''to require the production of such reports
would clearly violate the public policy evidenced by the statute [mandating those
reports]").
54. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.), aff'd on reh'g, 51 F.RD. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), ajf'd,
479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 250 (quoting Standards of Hospital Accreditation, ch. II, pt. C, ,r 4 (Jan.
1964)).
56. See Konrady, 149 F.R.D. at 598 (D. Minn. 1993). The Bredice court wisely
noted: "Gandid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of
adequate hospital care.... Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an
atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunc:iation
of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit." 50 F.R.D. at 250,
57. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
58, Id.
59, Id. at25l;seealso Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187, 188 (O.D.C.
1970) (rehearing, but adhering to earlier ruling).
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Subsequently. many courts have applied,60 and most states have

60. See, e.g., Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 214 N.W.2d 490, 492
(Neb. 1974) (holding records of medical staff committee concerning defendant
physician's suspension privileged); Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958,
961-62 (Ariz. 1976) (holding reports and minutes of medical review committee not
subject to subpoena in wrongful death action alleging hospital's negligence in retaining
anesthesiologist); Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D, Ga. 1976) (applying
Georgia statute protecting hospital medical review proceedings from discovery); Dade
County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. App. 1979) (noting the value of
ethics committee's confidential self-analytical reports "'would be destroyed if the
meetings and the names of those participating were to be opened to the discovery
process"') (quoting Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 2S0); Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691,
693 (D.D.C. 1984); Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101, 1106 (N.J. 1990) (holding that
opinions, criticisms, and evaluations in peer review committee reports are _l)rotected);
State ex rel. Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d 852, 855-56 (M"o. 1986) (holding
hospital peer review committee documents not discoverable); Emory Clinic v. Houston,
369 S.E.2d 913, 913 (Ga. 1988) (prohibiting discovery of peer review infonnation under
state peer and medical review statutes); In re "K", 561 A.2d 1063, 1066-67 (N.H. 1989)
(holding that hospital may have more than one "quality assurance committee" and
prohibiting discovery of minutes of hospital's infectious diseases committee); Estate of
HuS'sain v. Gardner, 624 A.2d 99, IOI (N.J. Super. 1993) (holding that opinions,
criticisms, and evaluations contained in hospital's internal peer review committee's files
absolutely privileged); Gates v. Deulanejian, No. Civ. S-87-1636 LKKJFM, 1988 WL
92568, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 1988) (holding minutes of hospital staff meetings
undiscoverable in civil rights suit alleging constitutional violations in operation of
medical facility). But see Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (holding that mental hospital's internal inquiry following patient's suicide was
protected as to its own procedural investigation, but not as to testimony regarding the
incident itself); Smith v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 605 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (I.a. 1992)
(acknowledging qualified privilege to records of hospital's infection control committee,
but not applying privilege to factual accountings); Konrady, 149 F.R.D. at 596 (holding
hospital institutional review board not a peer review committee); In re Parkway Manor
Healthcare Ctr., 448 N,W.2d 116, I 19M20 (M"inn. Ct App. 1989) (holding that nursing
home's quality assurance committee did not constitute a review organization under
Minnesota's peer review statute because the committee included nonprofessional
members); State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804,808 (M"o. 1984) (en bane)
(holding no privilege exists to protect factual infonnation compiled by peer review
committee); Robinson v. Magovem, 83 F.R.D. 79, 85-86 (YI.D. Pa. 1979) (holding
hospital peer review communications discoverable in antitrust action based on denial of
hospital staff privileges); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir.
1981) (refusing to apply privilege to peer review materials in physician's antitrust action
against hospital); Todd v. South Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676,682 (D.N.J. 1993)
(holding peer review privilege may be overcome by plaintiff's compelling need for
disclosure); Ott v. St Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706, 709 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (denying
privilege when there was no showing denial would impair peer-reivew committees'
functions); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 997-98 (NJ. 1985) (holding
confidentiality of state licensing board's investigative records overcome by plaintiff's
compelling need for disclosure); Wesley Med. Ctr. v. Clark, 669 P.2d 209, 215-17 (Kan.
1983) (holding interest in discovery outweighs need for confidential communications);
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codified,61 the common-law privilege enunciated in Bredice to protect
medical peer review documentation. Moreover, in an effort to extend
the privilege beyond the medical peer review setting, litigants have
asserted it in a variety of different contexts. For example, the privilege
has been asserted successfully in employment discrimination and
wrongful discharge cases in an attempt to shield self-evaluative
affirmative action plans and equal employment opportunity policies.62

Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7548(wk), 1989 WL
260217, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1989) (holding no privilege exists to protect
incident reports or factual information. contained in minutes of quality assurance
committee meetings); Davidson v, Light. 79 F.R.D. 137, 139-40 (D. Colo. 1978)
(holding infection control report discoverable in medical malpractice action); but cf. Wei
v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 98-99 (D,N.J. 1989) (holding pnvilege inapplicable to peer
review materials in physician's action against other physicians and hospital for
anticompetitive actions in violation of Sherman Act). See generally Christopher S.
Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physidans Find
Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L, REv. II 15 (1988) (providing good overview of
confidentiality of peer review proceedings); Gregory G. Gosfield, Comment, Medical
Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 566 (1979)
(discussing background and rationale of peer review functions).
61. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CoDE §§ ll57-ll57.7 (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-505 (1981); GA. CoDE ANN. § 31-7-143 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 14S.61-145.65
(West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 146.38 (West 1993). Some statutes only provide civil
immunity to peer review participants, while others erotect all or certain portions of the
reviews from discovery. Still other statutes provide both types of protection. See
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 119-20 n.25; Flanagan, supra note 20,
at 577 nn.136-44. See generally Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review
Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictio11al Survey, 67 N.C. L REv. 179 (1988). Qualified
immunity for peer review participation is also embodied in federal legislation. See
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-152. See generally
Susan L. Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: lts History,
Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. JL. & MED. 4S3 (1990),
62. Outside of the medical peer review context, the majority of cases dealing with
the self-critical analysis privilege deal with an employer's equal employment opportunity
evaJuations and affirmative action plans as those documents relate to employment
discrimination claims, See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir.
1985) (recognizing prevailing view that self-critical portions of affirmative action plans
are privileged, but not deciding whether privilege existed in that case because of waiver);
Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284-85 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding
undiscoverable defendant company's evaluation of its equal employment opportunities
because a "candid self-analysis" of its employment practices); Rosario v. New York
Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing newspaper to assert privilege
to protect self-evaluative affirmative action documents); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
85 F.R.D. 53, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying privilege to shield employer's affirmative
action plan from discovery); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.RD. 211, 216-18 (D.
Mass. 1980) (upholding qualified privilege to evaluative portions of employer's
affirmative action plans in gender discrimination case); Roberts v. National Detroit
Corp., 87 F.RD. 30, 32-33 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (allowing employer in racial discrimination case limited privilege as to portions of self-critical documents analyzing equal
employment opportunity goals); Hoffinan v. United TeJecomms., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440,
443 (D, Kansas 1987) (applying privilege to analysis performed for employer in
preparation of affirmative action program); Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
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(CCH) 'ii 8995, at 6164-65 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (holding privileged employer's affinnative
action plans and portions of reports containing such plans); Brown v, Ford Motor Co.,
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 8969, at 6026-28 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (noting split of authority
and competing interests, court ordered in camera inspection of employer's affirmative
action plans before ruling on discoverability); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.,
12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'ii 11,095, at 5070-71 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (declining to order
employer to disclose material regarding affinnative action plan, acknowledging the
chilling effect it would have on employer's critical self-analysis); Stevenson v. General
Blee. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 8777, at 5148 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (denying
discovery of affirmative action plans); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., I I Empl.
Prac. Dec. {CCH) ,r 10,666, at 6815 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (refusing to order disclosure of
employer's internal documents regarding personnel selection procedures); Sanday v.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 10,659, at 6796 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(refusing discovery of employer's affinnative action flan, so as not to destroy "candid
reflection and internal evaluation"); EEOC v. Genera Tel. Co., 885 F.2d 575, 578 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding evidence of employer's equal employment opportunity efforts
inadmissible); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 3716(wcc),
1984 WL 55541, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 1984) (upholding qualified privilege for
purely self-evaluative portions of defendants' affirmative action plans in gender
discrimination case); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. {BNA) 184
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding qualified privilege to self-evaluative portions of employer's
affirmative action plan in gender discrimination case); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (upholding qualified privilege for reports
summarizing employer's barriers to equal and fair employment of women in gender
discrimination case); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296-97 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (holding internal documents regarding equal employment opportunity
reporting requirements inadmissible in discrimination case); see also New York Stock
Exch. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (callaghan) 500, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) {holding
employee evaluations prepared by corporate auditor confidential); Korostynski v. State
Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 630 A.2d 342,348 (N.J. Super. 1993) (upholding privilege
to internal investigation records in 'WTODgful discharge case). But see In re Burlington
N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply privilege to employer's
affinnative action plan); Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433-35
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding studies demonstrating or tending to demonstrate racial
discrimination discoverable); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rwnsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978) (rejecting privilege because reports ''not
prepared solely for internal use"); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898,907
(8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting privilege because reports ''not made solely for intema1 use");
Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding
personnel practices study performed for employer by consulting firm and documents of
employer's employee relations committee not privileged because not governmentrequired reports); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193 (D.
Minn. May 3, 1988) (noting 8th Circuit's reluctance to accept the privilege and refusing
to apply privilege to affirmative action documents in Title VII gender discrimination
case); Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 41,600 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(holding privilege inapplicable to facts or data in affirmative action docwnents and
inapplicable to voluntary reports in Title VII discrimination case); Hoffman v. United
Telecomms., Inc., 50 Empl. Prac, Dec. (CCH) "J 38,953 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding
privilege inapplicable to personal opinion of company's affirmative action officer); Penk
v, Oregon State Bd., 99 F.RD. 511, 512 (D. Or. 1983) (holding privilege inapplicable
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The privilege also bas been applied less frequently to protect internal
police department investigations,63 bar association inquiries,64 academto voluntary reports); Steinle v. Boeing Co., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272 (D.
Kan. 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to voluntary job study reports in Title VII sex
discrimination case); Witten v. A.H. Smith Co., 100 F.RD. 446, 452-54 (D. Md. 1984),
afj'd, 185 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to recognize privilege in equal employment
opportunity case and allowing plaintiff access to affirmative action plans and EE0-1
reports, including self-evaluative portions); Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D.
457, 460 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (recognizing unlikelihood that Kentucky courts would
recognize privilege and compelling production of employer's affirmative action plan in
racial discrimination case); Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 611-12 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (noting that Michigan does not recognize privilege and compelling
production of affirmative action plans and EEO-I reports in wrongful discharge and sex
discrimination suit); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
468 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (acknowledging J?rivilege, but requiring production of selfevaluative reports regarding compliance Wlth statutory or regulatory guidelines because
the reports contained raw data); State ex rel. Corbin v. Weaver, 680 P.2d 833, 838 (Ariz.
Ct. App. I 984) (holding privilege inapplicable to documents gathered during employer's
investigation of employment discrimination charge); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F.
Supp. 1434, 1440-41 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding it is inappropriate to recognize privilege
in Title VII cases); Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'ii
40,079 (D.D.C. 1990) (refusing to apply privilege to equal opportunity reports in private
employment discrimination case); West v. Marion Lab., Inc., No. 90-0661-CV-W-2,
1991 WL 517230, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Dee. 12, 1991) (noting 8th Circuit's reluctance to
acknowledge privilege and requiring production of employer's affirmative action plan);
Frazier v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., Civ. A. No. 84-3004, 1988 WL 117869, at
*1-*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. t, 1988) (refusing to awly privilege to various documents,
including analyses, reports, and surveys relating to racia1 turnover, termination rates, and
sexual harassment, and Office of Civil Rights reports:); Hardy v. New York News, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 633,641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding documents pertaining to development of
affirmative action plan discoverable in employment discrimination action); Tharp v.
Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 180-85 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (refusing to apply privilege
to employer's affinnative action plans in sex discrimination case); Etienne v. Mitre
Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 148-49 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding privilege inapplicable to data
and studies regarding employer's compliance with equal employment opportunity law
in age discrimination case); Boyd v, City ofNew York, No. 86 Civ. 4501-CSH, 1987
WL 6915, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1987) (rejecting application of privilege to report
prepared by Human Resources regarding employment incident at issue); United States
v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (D. Conn. 1990) (denying corporate defendant
qualified privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents in action to enforce
Clean Water Act). See generally Hermie, supra note 8.
63. See Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. I, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (holding records of
police department privileged and not subject subpoena in petition for writ of habeas
corpus); Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding government
docwnents privileged and not subject to disclosure); Frankenhauser v. Rlzzo, 59 F.RD.
339, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discussing "chilling effect'' on police investigations and
calling the privilege an "executive privilege": "[T]he government's privilege to prevent
disclosure of certain infonnation whose disclosure would be contrary to the public
interest''); Ostoin v. Waterford Township Police Dep't, 471 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Mich.
App. 1991) (upholding qualified privilege to internal documents reflecting governmental
agency's "evaluative" or "deliberative processes"); Dos Santos v, O'Neill, 62 F.RD.
448, 449-51 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (acknowledging qualified "executive" privilege, but not
applicable to facts); Aleman v. Bonnstetter, No. 89 C 2480, 1991 WL 32757, at *7-111 8
(N.D. Ill. March 6, 1991) (applying qualified privilege because plaintiff showed no
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ic peer reviews,65 accident investigations,56 and environmental au-

exceptional circumstances). But see Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-13 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (holding police chief not entitled to protective order preventing discovery of
investigation of alleged assault by policemen); Denver Policeman's Protective Ass'n v.
Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435-36 (10th Cir. 1981) (ordering disclosure of police
investigative file, holding search for truth and criminal's need for exculpatory matter
outweighed any expectation of privacy on part of police); Elliot v. Webb, 98 F.R.D. 293,
297 (D. Idaho 1983) (allowing discovery of internal investigation of police officers in
civil rights action); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1061-62 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (acknowledging qualified privilege, but holding exceptional circumstances
overcame privilege); Asblll}' Park Press, Inc.. v. Borough of Seaside Heights, 586 A.2d
870, 874-75 (N.J. Super. 1990) (holding newspaper's and public's right to know
outweighed need of confidentiality); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 611-13
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to apply privilege and ordering production of internal affairs
records); Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (D, Colo. 1990) (recognizing
"official information" privilege, but requesting in camera review to determine
applicability of privilege).
64. See, e.g., In re Petition oflll. Judicial Inq_uixy Bd, 471 N.E.2d 601, 603-05 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (extending privilege to bar association's records relating to evaluation
of judges). But see Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161, 163-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (acknowledging privilege, but holding bar association's investigation
into transfer of judge discoverable because only factual materials requested).
65. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (upholding trial court's refusal to require production
of confidential faculty member evaluations in Title VII suit, but without specifically
mentioning privilege); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907-09 (2d Cir.
1982) (acknowledging privilege, but holding it outweighed by constitutional concerns);
EEOC v. University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d 331, 340 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying
privilege to peer review materials in racial discrimination claim by"professor), overruled
by University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); Zaustinsky v. University of Cal.,
96 F.R.D. 622,624 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging confidentiality of materials in peer evaluation files in tenured faculty member's Title
VII action based on gender discrimination); McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386
F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (applying privilege to tenure files). But see
University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (refusing to recognize privilege in Title
VII case to protect tenure peer review materials from disclosure where such materials
were relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426,
427 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v. Blaubers, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)
(holding vote in tenure review not protected by privilege).
66. See, e.g., Richards v. Maine Central R.R., 21 F.R.D. 593, 594 (D. Me. 1957)
(holding statements taken by defendant not discoverable when witnesses were equally
available to plaintiff); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 130-31 {5th Cir. 1969)
(allowing discovery of prior statements, but excluding mental impressions and personal
evaluations concerning railroad accident); Grangerv. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116
F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding analysis and recommendation portions of
railroad's postaccident investigation privileged in action under Federal Employers'
Liability Act); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 (N.J, Super. 1984) (upholding
qualified privilege to evaluative portions of internal postaccident report); see also
Culimuy Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
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dits. 67 Furthermore, the privilege has been raised to shield investigative
reports from discovery in securities,68 products liability,69 antitrust, 70

(acknowledging privilege, but not deciding applicability in particular discovery dispute);
Martin A. v. Gross, 605 N.Y.S.2d 742, 747-48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding "public
interest'' privilege protected internal city report regarding child abuse investigation). But
see Dowling v, American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding privilege inapplicable to safety committee minutes); Jolly v. Superior Court, 540
P.2d 658, 662-63 (Ariz. 1975) (refusing to create a privilege for safety inspections);
Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 916716, 1992 WL 97822, •9-*10 (E.O. Pa.
May 5, 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to industrial accident reports containing safety
recommendations); Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893,
898 (Colo, Ct App. 1993) (refusing to recognize privilege in Colorado); Peterson v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 364-65 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (refusing to
apply privilege to evaluation and recommendation portion of postaccident report).
61. See, e.g., Reichhold Chem,, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 157 F.R.D. 522, 526
(N.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding qualified privilege for retrospective analysis of prior
conduct, practices, occurrences, and resulting environmental consequences). But see
CPC Int'! v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 468 (N,J. Super. 1992)
(refusing to apply privilege to documents in connection with environmental cleanup of
toxic waste sites because insurers' needs for discovery outweighed any claim of
privilege); State er rel. Celebrezze v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Ohio
Ct App. 1990) (refusing to apply privilege to internally generated performance
evaluations of operators of hazardous waste facilities); TWAR, Inc. v. Pacific Bell, 145
F.R.D. 105, 107-08 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing to apply privilege to confidential audit
materia1s prepared pursuant to government mandate). See generally O'Reilly,supra note
13.

68. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 {8th Cir. 1977) {en
bane) (holding that disclosure of information to the SEC did not constitute waiver of
privilege: "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure
of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them
in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers."); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(applying privilege to internal analyses written by attorney); In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (prohibiting discovezy of internal
review of corporate audit and letter commenting on internal quality controls); In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1981} (holding that materials generated by·
special officer retained to implement SEC consent decree were privileged); Br.mes v.
IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 686-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying privilege to
documents in possession ofsecurities lawyer who had counseled defendants, even though
the information had been previously disclosed to the SEC); In re Dayco Derivative Sec.
Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 619-21 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding special committee report
prepared by outside counsel privileged). Diversified and In re Grand Jury Subpoena
actually were decided under the attorney-client privilege, but the rationale employed
supports the self-critical analysis privilege, See also New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan,
22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d {Callaghan) 500,505 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (a_pplying privilege in private
action under Securities Exchange Act to employee evaluations prepared by corporate
auditor). But see In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F,R.D, 453, 466-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding documents previously submitted to SEC discoverable); In re
Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed Sec. Litig. Rep. (CCH) 'ii 97,254 (S,D.N.Y. 1992)
(refusing to apply privilege); First R Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465,467 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (criticizing privilege and holding that bank had waived its claim of privilege); cf.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) (rejecting policy
arguments similar to those supporting self-critical analysis privilege and holding papers
of auditors used to prepare financial reports required by federal securities laws
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and libel actions.71 In addition, commentators have advocated extend-

unprivileged). See generally John F.X. Peloso, The Privilege for Sel.fCritical Analysis:
Protecting the Public by Protecting the Confidentiality of Internal Investigations in the
Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 229 (1990).
69. See, e.g., Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(upholding privilege to self-evaluative documents created by manufacturer for submission
to Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)); Adams v. Wecker, No. L-019761-85,
Law Division, Essex Co. (N.J. Super. 1985); Rickerson, supra note 8, at 507 (''(A]
federal district court prevented the disclosure of required governmental filings ... stating
'[t]he need to encourage full and frank disclosure of information to the government
regarding defective products is of crucial importance to the consuming public. The
success of the reporting scheme would be severely undercut if manufacturers feared that
their frank disclosures may be used against them in lawsuits."' (guotin~ Ashley v.
Uniden Corp. of Am., Civil No. SA-84-CA-2383 (W.D. Tex. 1986)); id. (noting case
wherein the internal report evaluating company's marketing of the product at issue,
which was generated by special committee of outside directors and outside lawyers, was
privileged: "To allow this self-evaluation to be used by litigation adversaries would
have an undue chilling effect on a cOipomtion's ability to evaluate its performance and
the actions of its employees where such evaluation is in the public interest." (quoting
McCracken v. Eli Lilly & Co., Case No. 34,463 (Cir. Ct. Ind. 1984)); see also Plough
Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1160 (D.C. 1987) (prohibiting
discovery by manufacturer in products liability suit of private scientific academy
documents); cf Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 520-22 (E.D. Tenn. 1977)
(disallowing discovery of actual contents, records, minutes, and memoranda of meetings
concerning self-evaluation of manufacturer's products in negligence action). But see
Lamitie v. Emerson Blee. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653-54 (App. Div. 1988) (refusing to
adopt privilege to protect manufacturer's communications with CPSC); Konrady v.
Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 598 (D. Minn. 1993) (refusing to apply "peer review"
privilege to institutional review board); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 685
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (acknowledging privilege where report required by Jaw, but refusing
to apply it to voluntary disclosure by manufacturer to CPSC); Scroggins v. Uniden
Corp., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct App. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge privilege where
manufacturer sought to protect its communications with CPSC).
70. See, e.g., Cohn v. Wilkes Gen. Hosp., 127 F.R.D. 117, 120-21 (W.D.N.C.
1989) (holding hospital's medical review information privileged); Cameron v. New
Hanover Mem'I Hosp., 293 S.E.2d 901, 915 (N.C. App. 1982) (applying privilege to
hospital review committee minutes in state antitrust suit). But see Memorial Hosp. v.
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply privilege to peer
review materials in physician's antitrust action against hospital); Wei v. Bodner, 127
F.R.D. 91, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding privilege inapplicable to peer review materials
in physician's action against other physicians and hospital for anticompetitive actions in
violation of Sherman Act).
71. See, e.g., Lasky v. American Broad. Co., 5 Fed R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1366
(S.D.N.Y, 1986) (acknowledging privilege, but holding inapplicable to facts). But see
In re Application of New York Times Co., No. MS-85, 1984 WL 971, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct 9, 1984) (criticizing privilege and holding it inapplicable to facts); Westmoreland
v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding investigation report of
defendant's television show broadcast not privileged in libel action).

Ill

ing the privilege to other types of corporate self-evaluations.n
The rationale for protecting self-analytical materials from disclosure
is the same in all these cases: the public's interest in encouraging candid
institutional self-analysis outweighs the public's concern of ensuring
complete disclosure of all relevant information to a litigant.n As
poignantly summarized by one court, "[t]he common theme linking all
these cases is that, in each, the policies in favor of confidentiality--protecting individuals' expectations of privacy and/or promoting free
communication of candid evaluations and criticisms within an organization--have been deemed strong enough to justify restrictions on liberal
pretrial discovery."74 Supporters of the privilege suggest that to allow
disclosure of self-evaluative materials would have a "chilling effect" on
candid and thorough self-appraisals.75 As several courts have recognized, "[c]onfidentiality and candor are complimentary to .one another.
Destroy one and the other vanishes." 76
In order to balance the competing policy interests between liberal
discovery and the need for candid self-critical analysis, courts acknowledging the privilege generally require four criteria before applying it.
The first three criteria were enunciated by the Bredice court: first, the
information sought to be protected must result from a self-critical
analysis performed by the party claiming the privilege; second, the free
flow of this type of information must advance a strong public interest;
and third, the information sought must result from the type of analysis
that would be curtailed if discovery were allowed. 77 The fourth

72. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 8, at 614-15; Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra
note 13, at 116-19; Crisman & Mathews, supra note 8, at 175-76; Murphy, supra note
8, at 499. But see Flanagan, supra note 20, at 582.
13. See Gish, supra note 13, at 79-80.
74. New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 500, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
75. See Gish, supra note 13, at 80; Harvard Note,supra note 9, at 1091-93; Beck,
supra note 12, at 358; see also Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting the privilege "is based upon the concern that disclosure of
documents reflecting candid self-examination will deter or suppress socially useful
investigations and evaluations or compliance with the law or professional standards'').
76. Baumgarten v. Koch, 411 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (1978) (quoting Lambert v.
Barsky, 398 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1977)).
77. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C.) affd on reh'g, 51
F.RD. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Bush, supra
note 8, at 605; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1086, Gish, supra note 13, at 80-82;
Conway, supra note 8, at 634; Zick, supra note 6, at 402; Taylor, supra note 13, at 797;
Beck, supra note 12, at 358; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 42526 (9th Cir. 1992); Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 307 (M.D. Ga. 1994); In re
Grand Jwy Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386,388 (D. Md. 1994); Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Service Co., 865 P.2d 893,898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); Peterson v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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criterion is the general proviso underlying the law of privileges--the
document sought to be protected was prepared with the expectation that
it would be kept confidential and in fact has remained so.78 Unfortunately, this balancing test as applied by the trial courts has resulted in
widely conflicting decisions and inconsistent applications of the
privilege.

C.

Judicial Impediments to Development of the
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

Even where the basic Bredice criteria for the self-critical analysis
privilege are satisfied, however, the existence of the privilege remains
uncertain, and self-analytical evaluations may be deemed discoverable.79 The judiciary has been increasingly reluctant to apply the selfcritical analysis privilege in cases beyond the medical peer review
context. In fact, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the circuit
courts have definitively denied the existence of the privilege or accepted
the privilege and defined its scope.80 Those courts that have acknowledged the privilege are in conflict regarding its application. The
privilege "at the most remains largely undefined and has not generally
been recognized." 81

1.

General Judicial Reluctance to Expand Privileges

The traditional concept of privileges is enunciated in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which have been

78. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2285, at 527; see also Shipes, 154 F.R.D.
at 307; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. at 388; Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426;
Combined Communications Corp., 865 P.2d at 898; Peterson, 112 F.R.D. at 363;
Westtnoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Flanagan, supra note
20, at 554-76; Gish, supra note 13, at 81.
79. See Gish, supra note 13, at 82.
80. See Dowling, 971 F.2d at426 n.l;ln re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp.
at 387.
81. Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518,522 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); see also
Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 147 (E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that the privilege
"has remained ... 'not generally recognized"') (citation omitted); FfC v. TRW, Inc.,
628 F.2d 207,210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lamitie v. Emerson Blee. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650,
653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 916716, 1992
WL 97822, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1992); In re Burlington N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765
n.4 (8th Cir. 1982).
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adopted by most states.32 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
discovery is liberally allowed.83 for "any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."84
"Relevance" is construed liberally.85 Even information potentially
inadmissible at trial is discoverable, absent a privilege, if such information could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.86 Thus, the
scope of relevance in discovery is broader than the standard of ultimate
admissibility at trial.87
In contrast to the concept of relevance, it is well-settled that the term
"privileged" as used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure corresponds
with the concept of "privilege" as developed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.88 Thus, in discovery, the concept of privilege "is neither

82. States have enacted substantially similar liberal discovery rules. E.g., CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE§ 2017 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997).
83. "The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of
witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation
of bis case." FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1946 amendment)
(citations omitted); see Gish, supra note 13, at 76 n.13.
84. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I). These liberal discovery provisions reflect the primacy
goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. I.
85. See. e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)
("[Relevance] has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in
the case."); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d II52, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that
"relevance" traditionally has been interpreted very broadly and declining to uphold a
discovery ruling that failed to adhere to the "liberal spirit'' of the discovery rules); Miller
v. Pnncucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (''The requirement of relevancy
should be construed liberally and with common sense, rather than in tenns of narrow
legalisms.")
86. "The information sought need not be admissible at the trial iftbe information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b){l).
87. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, ~ 26.07[1], at 26-120 through 26-121; WRIGHT
ET AL, supra note 26, § 2008, at 99-100. For the purpose of admissibility at trial,
evidence is "relevant" if it bas "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
88. Rule 1101 {c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]be rule with
respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." FED.
R. EVID. 1I0l(c); see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 6-7 (1953) ("We
think it should be clear that the tenn 'not privileged' ... refers to 'privileges' as that
term is understood in the law of evidence."); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058,
l061 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Rule SOI of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the
framework for determining whether material sought in discovery is privileged.''); Roberts
v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678,685 {N.D. Ind. 1985); Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360,363 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding evaluation and recommendation portions of derailment report unprivileged); infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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broader nor narrower than that which would be applied at trial.',s 9
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, privileges are
governed by common-law principles as interpreted by the federal courts,
but where state-law claims or defenses are involved, privileges are
determined by state law.90 Unlike relevance, privileges are construed
narrowly. 91 Although the spirit behind Rule 501 92 encourages courts

89. 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 11 26.11[1], at 26-172. See, e.g., Peterson, 112
F.R.D. at 362; Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 596 (8th Cir. 1977);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re LTV Sec.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600-06 (N.D. Tex, 1981) (allowing corporation to assert attorneyclient privilege and work-product doctrine to preclude discovery of attorney-generated
materials for the SEC).
90. [T]he privilege of a witness [or] person ... shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege ... shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
FED. R. Evm. 501. Typically, only federal privileges law will apply to a federal claim.
But in diversity actions where state law civil claims or defenses are involved, the state
Jaw of privileges will apply. Id.; see, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546,549 (3d
Cir. 1978) ("Rule 501 requires a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply
the law of privilege which would be applied by the courts of the state in which ft sits.");
see also WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 26, § 2016, at 223-24. See generally Martin I.
Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Litigation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 923
(197S); Olin Guy Wellborn m, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of
State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977).
When both state and federal claims are present in one case and a privilege exists only
under one set oflaws, the privilege will be unavailable. See, e.g., Perrignon v. Bergen
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.RD. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("If a communication were
privileged under state law but not under federal Jaw [or vice versa], it would be
meaningless to bold the communication privileged for one set of claims but not for the
other. Once confidentiality is broken, the basic purpose ofthe privilege is defeated.'')
91. 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'if 26.11[1], at 26-173.
92. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1914
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059, which indicates that Congress opted for the common-law
approach in enacting Rule 501: "It should be clearly understood that, in approving this
general rule as to privileges ... our action should be understood as reflecting the view
that the recognition of a privilege ... should be detennined on a case•by-case basis."
See also Upjobn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,396 (1981) (referring to ''the spirit
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501" and rejecting a request to develop standard in
determining whether a privilege exists); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189
(1990) (acknowledging that Rule 501 reflects Congress's intent to grant courts
"flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis"), In fact, Congress
rejected proposed Rules 502-513 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which specifically
enumerated thirteen privileges, including a privilege for reports required by governmental
entities. See FED. R. Evm. 501 advisory committee's note regarding H.R. 93-650; see
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to remain flexible in developing the law of privileges on a case-by-case
basis,93 privileges are generally disfavored94 and extended cautiously
because they frustrate the truth-finding process by impeding the
discovery of relevant information.95
While neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal
Rules of Evidence define ''privilege,"96 Professor Wigmore espouses
four requirements before courts can recognize a privilege: first, the
communications must have occurred with the expectation of confidentiality; second, confidentiality of such communications must be necessary
for the full maintenance of the relationship between the parties; third, the
relationship must be one that public policy encourages; and fourth, the
injury that the relationship would suffer by disclosure must outweigh the
benefit of disclosure. 97 Thus, Wigm.ore's approach attempts to balance
the societal interests in confidentiality against the societal costs.98
Wigmore's approach has been widely accepted by the courts, which
generally recognize the existence of a privilege only when the public's
need for confidentiality outweighs the public policy favoring full
disclosure of all relevant information.99

also supra note 26; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 'IJ 502[0SJ, at
502-13 (1996).
93. See Gish, supra note 13, at 77 n.18; 2 WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, 'IJ 501[03],
at 501-30 to 501-50.
94. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979), As one scholar noted,
"[IJbe development of judge-made privileges baited a century ago." Charles T.
McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 469
(1938).

95. See United States v. Nixon., 418 U.S. 683, 710, 713 (1974) (warning that
privileges are not to be "lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth" and holding that the grounds for asserting privilege
are based on a ~neral interes~versus an individual interes~in maintaining
confidentiality); Umted States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (recognizing the
"fundamental maxim that the public ... bas a right to every man's evidence") (quoting
8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2192); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 72,
al 171 (notin¥ that the effect of privileges "is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating
the illumination of truth, they shut out the light''); Leonard, An Emerging Privilege,
supra note 15, at 3; Gish. supra note 13, at 76.
96. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573-74.
97. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2285, at 531.
98. See Bush, supra note 8, at 640. But see id. at 636 n.255, 641 n.287 (asserting
that the social utility derived from ·application of the privilege outweighs its correspondent costs).
99. See 4 MOORE, supra note 26, 'IJ 26.11[3], at 26-192; Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (recognizing that privileges may be justified when there is "a
public good transcending the nonnally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means of ascertaining truth"); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981);
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-12 (1947); see also Gish, supra note 13, at 75
n.8, 77; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1084.
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2.

Judicial Limitations to the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

Assertions of privilege typically originate during the discovery stage
of a dispute; consequently, the law of privileges has been uniquely
molded by the trial courts. 100 But because the self-critical analysis
privilege is still in the early stages of development, it has not been
accorded the wide judicial acceptance given to the more traditional
privileges. 101 Expressing skepticism of this common-law privilege,
courts have modified the original four-part test espoused in Bredice and
its progeny by enumerating additional criteria that must be met before
they will apply the self-critical analysis privilege, thus narrowing its
application.
Typically, modern courts concede the possible existence of the
privilege under limited circumstances, but they ultimately hold that the
documents at issue do not fall within the scope of the privilege.l02 For
example, numerous courts have required that the materials sought to be
protected must have been prepared for mandatory government reports.103 Information voluntarily disclosed does not fall within the
100. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 796; Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573; Leonard,
Codifying a Privilege, supra note l3, at 149; Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra
note 15, at 3; Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1085 n.12. A trial court's rejection of the

privilege during discovery will not determine the ultimate admissibility of that
information during trial. In contrast to the liberal discovery standards, the standards for
admissibility are more stringent See Leonard, CodVJing a Privilege, supra note 13, at
149. Even if discovery of self-analytical documents 1s allowed, various rules of evidence
may prevent the admission of such infonnation at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407
(precluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or other
culpable conduct); see infra note 267 and accompanying text. But see Flanagan, supra
note 20, at 558 (noting that such information could be admissible as an admission
against interest or as a report of regularly conducted business activity). See generally
Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 149-51. But an evidentiaty privilege
that prevents the admission of certain information at trial also applies to prevent
discovery of that information. See FED. R. Evm. l lOl(c),(d); Flanagan, supra note 20,
at 553 n.12.
101. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 573.
102. See, e.g., In re Burlington N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982).
103. See, e.g., Shipes v. Bic Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301,307 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Culinary
Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297,304 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Roberts v. Carrier
Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95
F.R.D. 372, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to apply privilege to personnel practices study
because it was not required by government); Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81
F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding no privilege for employer documents that
were not mandatory government reports); see also Bush, supra note 8, at 609, 6IO;
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privilege. 104 Moreover, most courts have agreed that the privilege
extends only to subjective or evaluative materials; factual or objective
data contained in the same reports are not privileged. 105
Courts also uniformly have held the privilege inapplicable where the
documents at issue are souft by a governmental agency106 or pursuant
to a grand jury subpoena. 10 The courts' refusal to apply the privilege
against the government is logical in that the strong public interest in
"having administrative investigations proceed expeditiously and without
impediment'' 108 outweighs the public's need for confidentiality of
internal documents.
Further, the courts have imposed some of the limitations of the
attorney-based protections on the self-critical analysis privilege, as
weU. 109 As applied by the courts, the self-critical analysis privilege
resembles the work-product doctrine more than the attorney-client
Conway, supra note 8, at 637-38.
104. See, e.g., Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 684; Combined Communications Corp. v.
Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct App. 1993); see also Bush, supra note
8, at 609, 611-12; Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th
Cir. 1992).
105. See, e.g., Shipes, 154 F.R.D. at 307-08; Culinary Foods, 151 F.R.D. at 304;
Roberts v. National Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich, 1980); Roberts, 107
F.R.D. at 684-85; Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 374; Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D, 316,
319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also Bush, supra note 8, 609-10; Conway, supra note 8, at
63940; Zick, supra note 6, at 403-04. But see Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1093-96
(arguing in favor of qualified privilege for factual infonnation contained in selfevaluative document).
106. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (refusing
to apply privilege to reports compiled by credit reporting agency in course of National
Consumer Relations Audit); United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9 (D. Conn.
1990) (refusing to apply qualified privilege to corporate defendant's self-evaluative
documents); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Rumsfeld, 609 F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding privilege inapplicable in
proceeding to enforce an IRS production order where Congress has established a policy
requiring disclosure); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir.
1976) (holding affinnative action reports unprivileged where defendant was aware that
infonnation would be used for administration of Civil Rights Act); see also Bush, supra
note 8, at 609-10; Conway, supra note 8, at 652-54; Gish, supra note 13, at 84-85.
I 07. See. e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Md. 1994)
(refusing to apply privilege to internal audits by company subject to jurisdiction of FDA
and being investigated by grand jury for possible violations of FDCA).
108. Id. at388;FTCv. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d at2IO; see also FMC v. Port of Seattle,
521 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[The] very backbone of an administtative agency's
effectiveness in canying out the congressionally mandated duties of industry regulation
is [its] exercise of the power to investigate ••. .'').
109. Commentators have suggested that when possible, given the uncertainty of the
nascent self-critical analysis privilege, corporations should structure compliance efforts
so they qualify under one of the traditional attorney-based protections. See Murphy &
Oyer, supra note 8, at \2. See generally Nancy C. Cody, The Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Work Product Immunity Doctrine for the Corporote Client, 15 U. BALT. L. REV.
251 (1986).
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privilege. 110 Similar to the work-product doctrine, the application of
the self-critical analysis privilege is qualified and may be overcome
where the party seeking disclosure can demonstrate a compelling need
for the information. 111 Also analogous to the work-product doctrine,
courts have applied the self-critical analysis privilege only in the
discovery context. 112 Moreover, like the attorney-based protections, to
the extent a privilege for self-critical analysis exists, it can be waived
easily. 113
Over the past few years, the evolution of the self-critical analysis
privilege has been retarded even more by the 1990 Supreme Court
decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.U 4 In a unanimous
opinion, the Court admonished that before it would recognize a
privilege, the privilege must promote "sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence." 115 Acknowledging the
spirit of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court cautioned
against exercising such authority "expansively," stating, "[w]e are
especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears
that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has
not provided the privilege itself."116 The Court, reiterating the

I to. See Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; see also supra notes
43~52 and accompanying text
111. See, e.g., Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; Zick, supra
note 6, at404; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. at388; Culin~ Foods, Inc.
v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297,304 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Roberts v. Carner Corp., 107
F.R,D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372,
374 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D, 91, 100-01 (D.N.J. 1989) (rejecting
privilege in light of plaintiff's need for infonnation); Hardy v. New York News, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting privilege because plaintiff's interest in
gathering information outweighs any interest in maintaining its confidentiality). But see
Harvard Note, supra note 9, at 1098-1100 (arguing that court should not consider
plaintiff's "exceptional need" to give privilege its desired effect).
112. See Leonard, An Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 3; see also supra notes
60, 62-71, 100 and accompanying text
113. The traditional view is that any disclosure results in waiver. See WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 26, § 2016.2, at 241. Because the existence of a privilege typically
depends on confidentiality, "broaching this confidentiality as to one person destroys it
as to the world ... unless the disclosure was itself privileged." Id. § 2016.2, at 248-49;
see also Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 141-47; Leonard, An
Emerging Privilege, supra note 15, at 4; Conway, supra note 8, at 656-57; supra notes
37, 52 and accompanying text
114. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
115. Id. at 189.
116. Id.
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judiciary's traditional view that the policy favoring open discovery
requires privileges to be "strictly construed,"117 thus refused to extend
the self-critical analysis privilege to faculty comments or decisions made
during a faculty peer review procedure.
The courts' inconsistent applications of the self-critical analysis
privilege and the Supreme Court's failure to recognize the privilege have
caused its validity to be questioned. As acknowledged by the Supreme
Court, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all."118
Proponents of the self-critical analysis privilege suggest that its
questionable applicability has led corporations to fear that their selfanalytical reviews will be used against them in future litigation, thus
thwarting or "chilling" the candor with which such evaluations are
performed. The wide-spread judicial reluctance to extend the self-critical
analysis privilege and the resultant unpredictability of the privilege's
application to internal analytical reviews have prompted commentators
and various committees of the American Bar Association to advance
several proposals for codifying a broad self-critical analysis privilege
beyond the medical peer review context.119
But as discussed below, such statutes, which attempt to prevent
discovery of self-analytical reports, cannot be applied to product-safety
analyses performed by drug and medical device manufacturers because
the statutes fly in the face of the FOIA and FDCA public disclosure
requirements.

ill.

OVERVIEW OF DRUG AND 11.1EDICAL DEVICE REPORTING
R.EQUUIBMENTS UNDER TIIB FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG, AND

COSMETIC ACT

The FDA, whose primary objective is protecting the public's
health, 110 began actively regulating the manufacturing and marketing
of drugs and medical devices in 1938 with the enactment of the
FDCA. 121 In response to the public's health and safety concerns

117. Id.
118. Upjobn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
119. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege, supra note 13, at 119-20, 123-48; Murphy,
supra note 8, at 497-502.
120. See, e.g., Pbannaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA. 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (D.
Del. 1980) (citing United States v. An Article of Drug, Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784,
798 (1969)).

121. Prior to enactment of the FDCA, Congress's firtt attempt to regulate the drug
industry occurred in 1906 when it enacted the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906,
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caused by expanded modem medical technology, Congress steadily has
increased the FDA's control over the drug and medical device industry
by enacting a series of comprehensive amendments to the FDCA. 122
Under the extensive regulatory scheme set forth in the FDCA and its
accompanying regulations, drug and medical device manufacturers have
a continuing obligation to Erovide the FDA with numerous productsafety analyses or reviews 1 that include thorough and current information regarding the safety and effectiveness of their products.
For example, manufacturers must include complete product safety and
effectiveness data in all applications for investigational devices 124 and

which banned adulterated and misbranded drugs from interstate commerce. Pure Food
and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). In 1938, the FDCA added the
requirement that drug manufacturers demonstrate a drug's safety prior to marketing.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended as 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 {1994)).
122. These include: The Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § I, 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat.) 909 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 358-60, amending 21 U.S.C.
§§ 321, 331-32, 348, 351-53, 355,357, 372, 374, 376, 381) (under these amendments,
drug manufacturers had the added requirement of demonstrating a drug's effectiveness
prior to marketing); the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295,
§ l(a), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) I070 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379,
379a, amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 334, 351-52, 358,360,374,376, 381); the
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, § l(a), 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 95 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 353, 381, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3512, 15 U.S.C. § 55); the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629,
§ l(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4511 (adding 21 U.S.C. §§ 360/, 383, amending
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351, 353, 360c-360j, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263d, 263f-263k, 263n,
repealing 42 U.S.C. § 263b, redesignating 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n as 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360gg-360ss); the Medical Device Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-300, § l(a),
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)238 (amending21 U.S.C. §§ 321,331,334, 346a, 352-53,
356-57, 360c-360d, 360g-360i, 360i note, 360/, 371-372a, 376, 381, 42 U.S.C. § 262);
and the Prescription Drug Amendments of 1992 Pub. L. No. l02-353, § l(a), 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat) 941 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 333,353, 381).
123. "Product safety analysis or review'' is perhaps best defined as "any
investigation, inquiry, review, evaluation or other means by which a person or entity
seeks to detennine, calculate, predict, estimate, evaluate or report the safety or health
effects of the use of any of its products, systems, services or processes." ARIZ. REV.
STAT.§ 12-681 (1996).
124. A device manufacturer that sponsors a clinical investigation of one of its
medical devices must comply with the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE)
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.1-812.150 (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. pt 813 (1996).
The sponsoring manufacturer must submit a report of all "unanticipated adverse device
effects" to the FDA within ten working days after receiving notice of those effects. 21
C.F.R. 812.150(b). An "[u]nanticipated adverse device effect'' is defined as "any serious
adverse effect on health or safety or any life-threatening problem or death caused by, or
associated with, a device., if that effect, problem, or death was not previously identified

12[

in the underlying premarket submissions for each medical device. 125

Additionally, the FDA requires medical device manufacturers to submit
various reports for each marketed device. Medical Device Reports
(MDRs) constitute the majority of these postmarketing reports. 126
Under the MDR regulations, device manufacturers must inform the FDA
of all deaths or serious injuries 127 potentially related to a medical
device and of those device malfimctions 128 when serious injury or
death could result if the malfunction were to recur. 129 Moreover,
under the FDA's Good Manufacturing Practice regulations (GMPs),
device manufacturers must maintain accurate manufacturing, packaging,

... in the investigational plan •.. , or any other unanticipated serious problem
associated with a device ...." 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(s).
125. Prior to marketing a device, a device manufacturer must submit either 1) n
premarket notification submission (also lmown as a "5IO(k)" after section SIO(k) of the
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)),see 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.100 (1996), or2) a Premarket
Approval Application (PMA), see 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.1-814.84 (1996), depending on the
classification of the device, see 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1996). Under either type of
submission, complete product safety and effectiveness data must be included. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 807.87, 807.92, 814.20 (1996).
126. In addition to the MDRs that a device manufacturer must file, the FDA
regulations require the manufacturer to file, for each newly marketed device, annual
baseline reports, see 21 C.F.R. § 803.55 (1996), and an annual certification that it bas
filed all necessary MDRs during the pr-evious year, see 21 C.F.R. § 803.57 (1996),
127. A "serious injury" is defined in 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(aa)(l) as "an injury or
illness" that:
(i) Is life threatening;
(ii) Results in pennanent impainnent of a body function or pennanent
damage to a body structure; or
(iii) Necessitates medical or surgical intervention to preclude pennanent
impainnent of a body function or pennanent damage to a body structure.
21 C.F.R. § 803.3(aa)(l) (1996).
128. A "malfunction" is defined as "the failure of a device to meet any of its
perfonnance specifications or otherwise perform as intended." 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(m).
129. Under the MDR regulations, a medical device manufacturer must submit an
MDR to the FDA within thirty days after the manufacturer receives or otherwise
becomes aware ofinfonnation (e.g., in medical or scientific literature) that reasonably
suggests that one of its marketed devices: "(l) May have caused or contributed to a
death or serious injury; or 'I) (2) Has malfunctioned and ... would be likely to cause or
contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur." 21 C.F.R.
§ 803.SO(a) (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.20(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (1996).
Device
malfunction MDRs must be filed even when no injuries have resulted. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 803.3(q){2)(ii). But when the manufacturer becomes aware that a reyortable event
requires remedial measures ''to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial bann to the
public health," 21 C.F.R. § 803.53 (1996), it must submit a five-day report to the FDA
instead of the typical thirty-day report, 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.20(b)(3)(iii) (1996). Device
manufacturers also have the obligation to supplement any MDRs with additional
infonnation they may receive regarding a reportable event See 21 C.F.R. § 803.56
(1996). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360i (1996).
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quality assurance, and distribution records130 to assure the FDA that all
devices are safe and effective. 131
Similarly, drug manufacturers are required to file numerous reports
regarding the safety and effectiveness of their investigational132 and
marketed drug products. As with devices, companies must include
complete product safety and effectiveness information in all underlying
drug submissions. 133 Adverse Reaction Reports (ARRs)134 are the
most common postmarketing reports135 that drug manufacturers

130. See21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-820.198 (1996); 21 U.S.C. §§ 351,352, 360i, 360j(t),
374 (1996).
131. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.1.
132. Under the regulations governing investigational new drug applications (INDs),
a drug manufacturer that sponsors a clinical investigation for a drug must submit an IND
Safety Report within ten working days after the initial receipt of infonnation of any
adverse experience associated with the use of an IND drug that is both "serious" and
"unexpected," 21 C.F.R § 312.32(c)(l) (1996). A "serious" adverse experience is
defined as "any experience that suggests a significant hazard, contraindication, side
effect, or precaution...• [This] includes any experience that is fatal or life-threatening,
is pennanently disabling, requires inpatient hospitalization, or is a congenital anomaly,
cancer, or overdose," 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a). An "unexpected" adverse experience is
defined as one "that is not identified in nature, severity, or frequency in the current
investigator brochure; or ... in the risk infonnation described in the general investigational plan or elsewhere in the current application." Id. If the experience was fatal or
life-threatening, however, the manufacturer must make a telephone report to the FDA
within three working days. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c}(2). Drug manufacturers also must
submit annual reports for each IND containing a brief report of the progress of the
investigation, including a summary of all IND Safety Reports submitted during the prior
year. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.33 (1996).
133. Drug manufacturers must submit either a New Drug Application (NDA) and
or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) containing complete safety and
effectiveness data for each drug. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.94 (1996); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (1996).
134. Previously, these reports were known as Adverse Drug Reports (ADRs) and
currently may be called Adverse Experience Reports (AEs) under the FDA's proposed
rule. See 59 Fed. Reg. 54,046 (1994).
135. The FDA requires drug manufucturers to submit other postmarketing reports,
including an ''NDA-Field Alert Report," which must be submitted within three working
days of a manufacturer's receipt of information concerning any incident that causes the
drug or its labeling to be mistaken for or applied to another product or infonnation
concerning a drug's contamination, alteration, deterioration, or failure to meet
specifications. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.Sl(b)(l) (1996). Drug manufacturers also must
submit annual reports for each approved drug application. Among other voluminous
infonnation, the annual report for each drug must mclude a summary of significant new
infonnation that could affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug, and
summaries of clinical data on safety and effectiveness. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2).
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file. 136 Under the ARR reporting regulations, 137 drug manufacturers
must report "any adverse event associated with the use of' their drugs
in humans, even when the event is not deemed "drug-related" or "serious"138 and the event is "expected." 139 Additionally, like device
manufacturers, drug manufacturers must comply with the FDA's drug
GMPs to assure the FDA that all drugs are safe and effective. 140
These myriad reports enable the FDA to better protect the public
health and safety by ensuring that drugs and medical devices are not
"adulterated" 141 or "misbranded"142 and are "safe and effective for
their intended use." 143 To assist the FDA in its protective function, the

136. Drug manufacturers are required to submit ARRs under the NOA and ANDA
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 314.98 (1996).
137. ARRs consist of several types. The "Fifteen-Day 'Alert Report,"' must be
submitted by a drug manufacturer in four instances. First, such a report must be filed
within fifteen working days of the manufacturer's initial receipt of infonnation for an
adverse drug experience that is both "serious" and "unexpected." 21 C.F,R,
§ 314.SO(c)(l)(i). Additionally, a Fifteen-Day Alert Report Followup must be submitted
within fifteen working days of receipt of any additional infonnation. Id. Second, a
manufacturer also must file a Fifteen-Day Alert Report ifit discovers during a periodic
review that the frequency of serious, expected adverse drug experience reports or of
therapeutic failures has significantly increased. 21 C,F.R. § 314,80(c)(l)(ii), Drug
packers and distributors have identical mandatory reporting requirements in these fist two
scenarios. 21 C.F.R. § 314.SO(c)(l)(iii). Third, a Fifteen-Day Alert Report is required
if a drug manufacturer discovers in the scientific and medical literature reports of
serious, unexpected adverse drug experiences or reports of a significant increase in the
frequency of serious, expected adverse drug experiences or of therapeutic failures. 21
C.F.R. § 314.SO(d). Fourth, a Fifteen-Day Alerl Report is required duringposlfmuketing
studies if a serious, unexpected adverse drug experience occurs and a reasonable
possibility exists that the drug caused the experience. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(e), Drug
manufacturers also must file "Periodic Adverse Drug Experience Reports" quarterly for
three years from the date of each drug application approval, and annuaJly thereafter for
all adverse drug experiences that are .not both serious and unexpected. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.80(c)(2). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(k).
138. Similar to the definition of"serious" for an IND Safety Report, "serious" for
the purposes of an adverse reaction report under an NDA or ANDA is defined as "an
adverse drug experience that is fatal or life-threatening, is permanently disabling,
requires inpatient hospitalization, or is a congenital anomaly, cancer, or overdose." 21
C.F.R. § 314.SO(a).
139. For purposes of an ARR, "unexpected" is defined as "an adverse drug
experience that is not listed in the current labeling for the drug and includes an event
that may be symptomatically and patbophysiologically related to an event listed in the
labeling, but differs from the event because of greater severity or specificity." Id.
140. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-210.3, 211.1-211.208 (1996); 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352,
355, 374 (1994).
141. A drug or device is "adu1terated" when it fails to comply with the FDA's
standards for current good manufacturing practices. See 21 U.S.C. § 351.
142. A drug or device is "misbranded" when its labeling fails to comply with the
FDA's labeling requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 352.
143. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.2, 803.l(a), 814.2 (1996). Device distributors aJso have
similar mandatory reporting requirements. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 804.1-804.35 (1996); 21
U.S.C. § 360i(a) (1994). Under the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No, 101-
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reporting requirements require drug and medical device manufacturers
to include highly sensitive and self-evaluative information in their
product-related reports.
For example, the regulations governing investigational devices require
a manufacturer sponsoring a clinical study on a device to submit an
investigational plan to the FDA, including a "risk analysis" for the
investigational device, 144 and to submit evaluations of any unanticipated adverse effects that result from use of the device. 145 Similarly, the
MOR reporting statute requires the device manufacturer to include not
only factual information in its reports, 146 but also self-analytical
information, such as a summary of how the device was involved in the
event, any environmental conditions that tnay have influenced the event,
relevant laboratory data, and a summary of the event evaluation
performed by the manufacturer. 147 If the FDA determines that additional information is necessary to protect the public health and safety, it
may require the manufacturer to submit additional self-evaluations of the
device's risk of death or serious injwy,148 including failure analyses
and any laboratory testing or other analyses used by the manufacturer, 149 any evaluation of whether the reported incident is attributable to

629, § !(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat) 4511 {adding 21 U.S.C. §§ 360/, 383,
amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 333, 351, 353, 360c-360j, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263d, 263f-263k,
263n, repealing 42 U.S.C. § 263b, redesignating 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n as 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360gg-360ss), "device user facilities," such as hospitals, nursing homes, and
outpatient treatment facilities, see 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(5)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 803.l(a),
803.3(f), 803. l0(a), 803.30-803.33 (1996), also have mandatory reporting requirements
for all device-related deaths or serious injuries. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 803.10, 803.30. But reports of adverse drug experiences are still voluntary for druguser facilities.
144. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.25(c) (1996).
145. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.150(b)(I) (1996); discussion supra note 132.
146. Such required factual infonnation includes the name of the device, its model
and serial numbers, the name, address. and telephone number of the manufacturer, the
name and address oftbe individual providing the infonnation to the manufacturer, and
a factual narrative of the event giving rise to the report. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.52 (1996).
147. See id. Under the 1995 regulations, the manufacturer also was required to
assess whether the event "has occurred or [was] occurring more frequently or with
greater severity" than was stated in the device's labeling or than was usual for the
device. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(c)(7) (1995), repealed effective 1996 by 60 Fed. Reg.
63,590 cmt.41 (1995). The manufacturer also must assign an "evaluation code" from the
FDA Coding Manual to the event See 21 C.F.R. § 803.52(t)(6).
148. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.15 (1996).
149. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(e)(4).
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the device and the basis for that determination, 150 the basis for deter"
mining whether remedial action is necessary, accompanied by an outline
of a remedial action plan,151 and any evaluations or analyses used by
the manufacturer to determine whether the event "has occurred or is
occurring more frequently or with greater severity" than is expected. 152
Analogous to their device counterparts, the various drug reporting
regulations require a drug manufacturer not only to include in its various
mandatory reports factual information, such as the name of the drug and
the time period during which the increased frequency arose, but also to
include critical self"evaluative information. For example, a drug
manufacturer sponsoring a clinical study of an investigational new drug
must analyze the significance of any adverse drug experience. 153
Further, the regulations for marketed drugs require a drug manufacturer
to alert the FDA of a significant increase in the frequency of adverse
drug experience reports and to supply the manufacturer's method of
analysis and its interpretation of the results. 1S4
Another prime example of when the FDA requires self-analytical
information from drug and medical device manufacturers is when a drug
or device is recalled. While most recalls are voluntary actions undertak"
en by drug and medical device manufacturers in "carry[ing] out their
responsibility to protect the public health and well~being from products
that present a risk of injury or ... are otherwise defective," 15 various
factual and analytical data relating to the recall must be submitted to the
FDA. Initially, the manufacturer will be asked to provide the FDA with
its evaluation of any risks associated with the product being recalled. 156
Additionally, under the FDA recall policy, the manufacturer must
prepare a "Health Hazard Evaluation," which includes an evaluation of
the health hazard posed by the product being recalled and assessments
of the degree of seriousness, the likelihood of occurrence, and the
consequences of the hazard. 157

150. Id. § 803.24(e)(6).
151. Id. § 803.24(,)(8).
152. Id. § 803.24(e)(7).
153. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(l)(ii) (1996).
154. 21 C.F.R. § 314.SO(c)(l)(ii) (1996). Further, each Periodic Adverse Drug
Experience Report submitted to the FDA must contain an analytical summary of the
information contained in the report, an analysis of each Fifteen-Day Alert Report
submitted during the interval covered by the Periodic Report, and a history of actions
taken since the prior Periodic Report due to adverse drug experiences. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.80(c)(2}(ii); see discussion supra note 137.
155. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(a) (1996).
156. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.46(a}(3) (1996).
157. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (1996).
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While these numerous FDA-required reports do not necessarily
constitute an admission by the manufacturer that the device malfunctioned or caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, 158 or that
a drug caused or contributed to an adverse experience, 159 once the
reports are submitted, the desired confidentiality of any self-analytical
efforts is jeopardized. Under the liberal FOIA disclosure provisions and
FDA regulations governing access to FDA records, the public has an
immediate right to access the nonexempt portions of such reports. 160
IV.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The FOIA, 161 enacted in 1966, established for the first time162 an
effective public statutory right to access all federal agency records, 163
unless such records are protected from disclosure by one of nine specific

158. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.16 (1996).
159. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.32(e), 314.80(1) (1996). Indeed, prudent manufacturers
routinely deny such an admission by including appropriate exculpatory language in the
reports they submit to the FDA.
160. See infra notes 161-77, 191-206 and accompanying text
161. S U.S.C. § SS2 (1994).
162. The FOIA was enacted after substantial and lengthy debates between
government officials, legislators, and public interest groups. The FOIA revised the
ineffective public disclosure se<::tion of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (1964), which bad come to be viewed as a withholding statute rather than a
disclosure statute. See MARK BRIDGES & TIFFANY VILLAGER, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
GUIDE TO THE fREEDoM OF INFoRMATION ACT 3 (1992); l JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN &
RoBERT F, BOUCHARD,GUIDEBOOK TO THE FltEEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY
ACTS§ 1.02, at 1-12 (2d ed. 1996); AlvinJ. Lannan ct al., Tilting the Balance in Favor
ofDisclosure: The Scope of the Medical Records Exemption to the Federal Freedom of
lnfomiationAct, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 17, 17-18 (1988); James M. Johnstone, The
Freedom oflnfonnation Act and the FDA, 25 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 296, 296 (1970);
Janice Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom ofJnfonnation Act
and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843,844 (1981). See also
S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong. 5, 38, 40-41 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Report]; H.R.
Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2418-23
[hereinafter 1966 House Report]. See generally 1 JAMES T, O'REILLY, FEDERAL
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE §§ 2.01-3.08, at 2-1 to 3-31 (1987) (discussing historical
origins and evolution of the FOIA).
163. State agencies are not subject to the FOIA, but most have enacted state
counterparts. Twenty-nine states have state freedom ofinfonnation laws modeled after
the federal FOIA, while the other twenty-one states have somewhat different state open
records statutes. See 15 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 38:24, at 48-49 (Lawyers ed. 1990); 2
FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, state statutes app. See generally 2 O'REILLY
supra note 162, §§ 27.01.-05, at 27-1 to -25.
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exemptions. 164 "Agency records" consist of records that are created or
obtained by a federal agency and under agency control at the time of the
disclosure request. 165 An FOIA request can be made by "any per•
son," 166 including an attorney acting on behalf of a client. 167 More•
over, FOIA requests need not be explained or justified; rather, such
requests can be made for any purpose, and no showing of relevancy is
required. 168
The fundamental principle underlying the FOIA is that "an informed
citizenry is essential to the democratic process.'' 169 Congress realized,

164. The exemptions are -enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)•(9) (1994); see infra
note 171. See also BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 3; l FRANKLIN &
BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § l.02, at 1-12. Agency records also can be protected from
disclosure by one of three exclusions relating to law enforcement records, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c)(l). Even if the requested infonnation falls within one of the enumerated
exemptions, however, the exemptions generally are deemed discretionary in nature and
not mandato,:y. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979)
("Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.'');
see also 0/P Guidence: Discretionary Disclosure and Exemption 4, FOIA UPDATE
(Office of Infonnation & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice), Summer 1985, at 3;
Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Reno to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4,
1993), in FOIA UPDATE (Office of Information & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice),
Summer/Fall 1993, at 4-5 [hereinafter Reno's FOIA Memorandum] (encouraging
discretionary disclosures of otherwise exempt information whenever possible). See
generally l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.14[1], at 1·383 to •392; 1
O'REILLY supra note 162, § 9.05, at 9-15 to-18.
165. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 14445
(1989).
I 66. "Person" is defined broadly to include individuals, partnerships, corporations,
associations, and public or private organizations. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1994).
167. See, e.g., Constangy, Brooks & Smith v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 839, 840 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1988); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act for Discovery
Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 123 & n.16 (1984).
168. See Toran, supra note 162, at 844. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989) (noting that the
purpose for which records are sought under the FOIA has no bearing upon the merits of
the request); North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding requester's
identity and intended use of information not proper factors in detennining rights to
access infonnation under FOIA). The FOIA enumerates only two prerequisites for FOIA
requests: First, the request must "reasonably describe" the information sought, and
second, the request must be made in compliance with the particular agency's published
procedural regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)·(B) (1994).
169. Memorandum from President Clinton to Heads of Departments and Agencies
(Oct. 4, 1993), in FOIA UPDATE (Office of Infonnation & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of
Justice), Summer/Fall 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Clinton's FOIA MemorandumJ; see also
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (''The basic purpose
of [the] FOIA is to ensure an infonned citizen,:y, vital to the functioning ofa democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed."). During the debate of the FOIA in the House of Representatives, ReP..
Rumsfeld quoted one of the Founding Fathers in supporting the FOIA: "Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular
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however, that achieving an ''informed citizenry" is a societal goal that
can conflict with other societal interests, such as preserving the
confidentiality of sensitive information. 170 Congress reconciled these
countervailing concerns by enacting nine specific exemptions from
disclosure under the FOIA. 171 Because of the emphasis on the "fullest

infonnation or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or
perhaps both." 112 CONG. R.Ec. 13,661 (1966) (statement of Rep. Rumsfeld quoting
James Madison, 1822).
170. See I 965 Senate Report, sup_ra note 162, at 38. See also 1966 House Report,
supra note 162, at 2423, which provides:
It is vital to our way of life to reach a work;able balance between the right of
the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in
confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.
The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is
operating can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his right
to confide in his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering all these
interests.
Sensitive infonnation entitled to confidentiality may include personal, commercial, and
governmental infonnation. Public interests competing with the public's need for
disclosure include preserving the efficient operations of governmental agencies and
ensuring responsible use of limited fiscal resources of those agencies. See BRIDGES &
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 3; 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at
1-13; Lorman ct al., supra note 162, at 18. Even President Johnson, in si~ing the FOIA
bill, recognized the conflicting principles of disclosure and confidentiality, when he
cautioned: "[T]he welfare of the Nation or the rights of individuals may require that
some documents not be made available." See Statement by President Johnson upon
Signing Public Law No. 89-487 (July 4, 1966) in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OFTHEADMINISTRA•
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT Il (June 1967) [hereinafter Johnson's Statement].
171. The nine FOIA exemptions are enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), which
provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are-(1) (A) specifically authorized Wlder criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B)
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b
of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial infonnation obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inteMgency or intra-agency memorandums or letteIS which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) peISonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure ofwhich would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of peISonal privacy;
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possible disclosure,"172 courts have applied a balancing test that
''weighs the magnitude of the privacy invasion against the public interest
to be served by disclosure" in determining whether information can be
withheld under one of the circumscribed FOIA exemptions. 173 Al~
though courts consider numerous factors in applying this balancing test,
the primary factor is whether disclosing the information sought will
increase the public's ability to monitor governmental action.t74
Because the FOIA mandates courts "to tilt the balance in favor of
disclosure," 175 it is unlikely that courts will deny public access to
government records, absent exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, the Department of Justice has undertaken a recent
"openness-in-government" campaign under the directives of President
Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno, who both issued new FOIA
policy statements in October 1993. Calling upon governmental agencies
to follow the "spirit" as well as the letter of the FOIA, President Clinton

(7) records or infonnation compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement

proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished
information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation or by an agency conducting a )awful national security intelligence
investigation, infonnation furnished by a confidential source, (E) would
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circwnvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the
life or physical safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination. operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection.

5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(IH9J (1994).

172. 1~65 Senate Report, supra note 162, at 3, 38.
173. Lorman et al., supra note 162, at 28; see, e.g., Ripslds v. Department ofHous.
& Urban Dev., 746 F.2d I, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Sullivan, Inc. v. Veterans Adm.in., 617
F. Supp. 258, 260 (D.D.C. 1985); see aUo Lonnan et al., supra note 162, at 22-30.
174. See, e.g., Marzen v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 825 F.2d 1148,
1152 (7th Cir. 1987); Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health & Human Serv.,
690 F. 2d 252,264 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Lennan et al., supra note 162, at 29-30.
175. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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declared that "[o]penness in government is essential to accountability and
the [FOIA] has become an integral part of that process."176 This
pronouncement of a "sunshine government" was bolstered by Attorney
General Reno's articulation of Congress's primary objective in enacting
the FOIA: achieving "maximum responsible disclosure of government
information."177
A.

Ine lnte,face Between the FOIA and the Discovery Rules

Similar to the disclosure provisions of the FOIA, which reflect a
congressional policy favoring open disclosure of federal records to the
general public, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have an underlying goal of promoting the liberal disclosure
of relevant information to civil litigants. 178 Also, as with the FOIA
disclosure provisions, courts and commentators have interpreted the
discovery rules as favoring broad pretrial disclosure ofinformation. 179
The FOIA was "fundamentally designed to inform the public about
agency action and not to benefit private litigants."180 Despite the
Supreme Court's admonition that the FOIA was "not intended to
function as a private discovery tool," 181 neither the FOIA nor the
discovery roles prohibit the concurrent use of both systems. 182 Addi-

176. Clinton's FOIA Memorandum, supra note 169, at 3; see also Johnson's
Statement, supra note 170 C'A democracy works best when the people have all the
infonnation that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able to pull
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public
interesL"); Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
("[W]here trade secrets are not at issue, common sense would indicate that the greater
a corporation's motivations for secrecy, the greater the public's need to know.") (citing
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FfC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)).
177. Reno's FOIA Memorandum, supra note 164, at 4-5.
178. See Toran, supra note 162, at 843.
179. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; see also Toran, supra note 162,
at 846-47.
180. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); see also
United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799-800 (1984); Baldridge v.
Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345,360 n.14 (1982); Renegotiation Bd v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,
415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (''Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated
purpose of the [FOIA].").
181. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978); see also
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989); United States v.
Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the FOIA does not "enlarge
the scope of discovery beyond that already provided by the [Rules]'').
182. See Toran, supra note 162, at 848.
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tionally, Congress considered-and specifically rejected-a 1981
proposal by the Reagan Administration to absolutely bar ~rivate litigants
from utilizing the FOIA as a supplement to discovery. 83 Thus, civil
litigants successfully have supplemented their discovery by FOIA
requests, 184 even though the FOIA was not enacted to aid them. 185
If the information sought is, by statute, public information, it does not
follow that a p ~ can make a successful claim of privilege under the
discovery rules. 1 Indeed. federal courts have held that the government cannot raise a privilege defense in response to a discovery request
if the FOIA required it to release the information to the public.
For example, the Fourth Circuit, in holding that a government agency
could not raise a privilege claim for a document that is already in the
public domain by virtue of the FOIA, stated that "Rule 26(b) does not
authorize an agency to withhold any records which the [FOIA]
commands it to disclose."187 Further, a district court, in ruling on the
government's privilege claims in an antitrust suit, determined that
"[i]nformation obtainable by a member of the public under the [FOIA]
is not privileged."188
Thus, the general approach in the federal courts is that information
available under the FOIA is not privileged and therefore discoverable if
relevant. It would be incongruous to apply different standards to the
discovery provisions of the FOIA and to claims of privilege under the
discovery rules. As one commentator noted, "[b]ecause both systems are

183. The proposal, introduced as $. 1751, 97th Cong. (1981), provided: "A
requester shall not make or maintain a request under this paragraph for records relating
to the subject matter of any ongoing judicial or adjudicatory administrative proceeding
... to which the requester, or any person upon whose behalf the requester acts in
making the request, is a party." See also Tomlinson, supra note 167, at 192 & n.3S3.
184. See, e.g., Jackson v. First Fed. Sav., 709 F. Supp. 887, 889 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
See generally Tomlinson, supra note 167; Toran, supra note 162, at 8S4-65.
US. But see Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. at 30
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that one of the purposes ofthe FOJA was "discovery
for litigation purposes").
186. See4 MOORE, supra note 26, ~ 26.12[3], at 26-224; Toran, supra note 162, at
849.
187. Moore-McConnack Lines, Inc. v. l.T.0. Corp. ofBaltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 950
(4th Cir. 1974); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Coleman, 432 F. Supp. 1359,
1371 n.23 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("Infonnation which the government must disclose to the
public generally may not be withheld from a member of the public who engages the
government in litigation.").
188. United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 635 (D.D.C. 1979); see also Jupiter
Painting Contract Co. v, United States, 87 F.R.D. 593,597 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that
"FOfA availability should ... defeat a claim of privilege under Rule 26(b)(I)" where
a litigant has demonstrated the relevance of the infonnation sought).
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explicitly intended to increase the flow of information, the use of both
systems together should facilitate ... access to information."18!1

B.

Public Disclosure Regulations Under the FDCA

The FOIA requires each federal agency to publish its own procedural
regulations governing access to its records. 190 The FDA, under its
public disclosure regulations, l!Jl endorses the FOIA policy of full
public disclosure of nonexempt agency records, regardless of whether a
requester has demonstrated any justification or need for such records. 192 The FDA regulations mirror the FOIA and include specific
exemptions for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information,1 93 for .inter-agency or intra-agency communications, 194
for materials that would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, 195

189. Toran, supra note 162, at 871.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l), (a)(4)(A) (1994). These regulations must inform the
public of where and how to address requests for agency records, of the types of records
maintained by that agency, of the applicable fees, and of procedures to be followed in
appealing a refusal to disclose requested infonnation. Id.
191. The FDA's FOIA regUlations are set forth in 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.I-20.119,

1401.l-1401.15 (1996).
192. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.20.
193. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61; see also Exemption 4 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4) (1994). See generally l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.07,
at 1-133 to 1-183; I O'REILLY supra note 162, §§ 14.01-14.20, at 14-1 to 14-122;
BRJDOES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 52-67.
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.62; see also Exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5). See generally 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.08, at l-183
to I-227; 2 O'R.Err..LY, supra note l62, §§ 15.01-15.19, at 15-2 to 15-91; BRIDGES &
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 67-90. This exemption is also known as the "deliberative
process privilege," id. at 71-79, the purpose of which is to ''prevent injury to the quality
of agency decisions," NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).

Similar to the policy underlying the self-critical analysis privilege, one key policy
underlying the deliberative process privilege is to encourage free and frank discussions
on matters of policy within the agency without being questioned by the public. 1
FRANKLIN & BouCHA.RD, supra note 162, § 1.08[2], at 1-190 & n.41; 2 O'REILLY, supra
note 162, § 15.02, at 15-3 to 15-5; BRIDGES & VIl.LAGER, supra note 162, at 71. Even
the deliberative process privilege, however, is narrowly construed and is inapplicable to
factual portions of otherwise deliberative documents. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,867 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also 1 FRANKLIN &
BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.08[2], at 1-190 to -195; 2 O'REILLY, supra note 162,
§ 15.05, at 15-20 to 15-27; BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 77-78.
195. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.63; see also Exemption 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6). See generally Lorman et al., supra note 162; I FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD,
supra note 162, § 1.09, at 1-227 to 1-268; 2 O'REILLY,supra note 162, §§ 16.01-16.14,

133

and for information compiled for law enforcement purposes. 196 These
exemptions, however, may be waived once a record is disclosed to any
member of the public. 197
Although drug and medical device manufacturers routinely stamp
submitted reports as "confidential," this will not suffice to protect the
reports from public disclosure. 198 But when the confidentiality of
requested information is uncertain, the FDA wi11 consult with the
manufacturer who has submitted the information before determining
whether to disclose it. 199 If the FDA rejects a manufacturer's request
of confidentiality, the manufacturer can institute a "reverse FOIA suit''
to prevent disclosure.200 In its FOIA regulations, the FDA specifically
has announced the public availability of data regarding the safefdJ and
effectiveness of investigational and marketed drugs and devices,2 1 and
of all product-related reports,2 02 subject to the removal of exempt
information.203 The public disclosure provisions relate not only to a

at 16-1 to 16-38; BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 90-107. Such infonnation
includes information that would identify patients, research subjects, or voluntary
reporters or other persons associated with any adverse event involving a human drug or
device. 21 C.F.R. § 20.63.
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.64; see also Exemption 7 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7). See generally I FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.10, at 1-268
to 1-364; 2 O'REILLY, supra note 162, §§ 17.01-17.18, at 17-2 to -74; BRIDGES &
VILLAGER, supra note 162, 107-45.
197. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.21, 20.80(b), 20.81 (1996).
198. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.27 (1996); .see al.so Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp,
367, 372 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting the notion "that by merely labelling these materials
'confidential' and 'privileged,' they magically become so"), But a manufacturer can
request a "presubmission review" of infonnation it is considering submitting on a
voluntary basis to determine whether the FDA will treat the infonnation as confidential
and thus exempt from public disclosure. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.44 (1996),
199. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.45 (1996).
200. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 28 I, 317-I 8 (I 979) (establishing rights
of those submitting infonnation to federal agencies to bring reverse FOIA suits). See
generally BRIDGES & Vn.LAGER, supra note 162, at 202-06; l FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD,
supra note 162, § 1.17, at 1-529 to 1-546.
201. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(/), 360j(h) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.180-211.198 (drug
GMPs), 312.130 (IND), 314.430(e)(2) & {f) (NOA & ANDA), 807.95 (510(k)), 812.38

ODE), 814.9 (PMA), 820.180 (dovice GMPs) (1996).
202.

These include IDEreports,see21 C.F.R. §§ 812.38,814.9(t)(3)(1996), MDRs,

see 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.l00(c)(36), 803.9, IND Safety Reports, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.130,
314.430(e){4) (1996), and ARRs, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.IO0(c)(17), 314.430(e)(4) (1996).
203. If a requested record contains both exempt and nonexempt infonnation, the
exempt portions must be redacted prior to disclosure. See 21, C.F.R. §§ 20.22, 20.60(b)
(1996); .see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). But the entire record can be withheld if the
two types of infonnation are "so inextricably intertwined that it is not feasible to
separate them." 21 C.F.R. § 20.22; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), Infonnation such as
names of patients, health care providers, and user facilities are not releasable to the
public under the FDA's public disclosure regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.S0(h),
314.430(e)(2)(i)(a), 314.430(e)(4)(i), 803.9(b) (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. pt 20 (1996).

134

[VOL, 34: 93, 1997]

Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

manufacturer's mandatory FDA submissions, but also to voluntary
reports. 204 Furthermore, all correspondence205 and all written summaries of oral discussions206 between a drug or device manufacturer
and the FDA are available for public disclosure.

C.

Possible Preemption of the Seif-Critical Analysis
Privilege Under the FOIA

State statutes and cases applying the self-critical analysis privilege to
maintain the confidentiality of information submitted to federal agencies,
such as the FDA, prohibit disclosure of the precise type of information
Congress sought to make public under the FOIA. Consequently, such
state laws may be invalid under the Supremacy Clause, which mandates
that the federal constitution and all federal laws "made in [pJursuance
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."207 Federal law is
broadly defined to include not only the federal constitution and federal
statutes, but also federal regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies acting within the scope of their congressionally delegated
authority.208 Federal law not only preempts conflicting state statutes

Additionally, trade secret and confidential commercial or financial infonnation is not
available for public disclosure. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.430(.g), 803.9(b).
204. See21 C.F.R. §§ 20.111-20.113 (1996).
205. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.103 (1996).
206. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.104 (1996).
207. Article VI, Clause 2 ofthe Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
208. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986)
(holding a federal agency may preempt state Jaw when it is acting within the scope of
its congressionally delegated authority); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect
than federal statutes."); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984)
(quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta): Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 182 (1962); City of Tacoma Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 341 (1958); see also Pennington Parker Landen, Federal
Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM.
L.J. 85, 86 (1988).
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and regulations, but also preempts conflicting judicial decisions. 209
The purpose underlying the Supremacy Clause is "to avoid the
introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts which would follow
if the Government's general authority were subject to local controls."210 Although the federal government has limited powers with
respect to the states,211 states cannot exercise inconsistent powers in
those areas in which the federal constitution grants the federal government the power to act.212 Accordingly, state courts and legislatures
have the obligation to guard and enforce every right guaranteed by the
federal constitution.213 Neither state common law nor state legislative
action can supersede a conflicting federal law; rather; state laws that
conflict with federal laws are subordinate and necessarily must yield
under the Supremacy Clause.214 Absent Congress's express preemptive
intent,215 its intent to supersede state law in a specific area may be
implicit.216 Congress's intent to preempt state law in a given area may
be implied in several ways.217 First, such intent can be implied from

209. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't oflndus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc.,
475 U.S. 282,286 (1986); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406, 1412
(5th Cir. 1987).
2IO. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
211. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)
("Consideration of [preemption] 'starts with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the
clear and manifest purpose ofCongress."') (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218,230 (1947)); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (holding that
it initially must be presumed that "Congress did not intend to displace state law").
212. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 370 (1980).
213. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,331 (1941); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 108 (1935).
214. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 751 (holding that state tax law
inconsistent with federal scbeme ,vas preempted),
215. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985) (acknowledging Congress may preempt state law by expressly statin~
so); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1977) (holding explicit
preemption provision in Federal Meat Inspection Act prohibited conflicting state law).
216. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) ("[W]hen the question is
whether a Federal act overrides a state law ... that which needs must be implied is of
no less force than that which is expressed.")
217. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (holding
Congress's intent to preempt state Jaw may be implicit where (I) the federal regulatory
scheme is pervasive, (2) the federal interest in the subject matter is dominant. and (3)
the goals sought to be obtained reveal a purpose to preclude state control); Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding Congress's intent lo
preempt state law may be implicit where (I) there is an actual conflict between federal
and state laws, (2) compliance ,with both federal and state Jaws is impossible, (3)
Congress has legislated comprehensively, or (4) the state laws serve as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress's objectives); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at
751; Landen, supra note 208, at 89-94.
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the legislative history underlying a federal statute or regulation.218
Second, preemptive intent can be implied when the federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive that it leaves no room for supplemental state
regulation.219 Third, when Congress has a dominant federal interest in
a particular subject matter2211 or when national uniformity is desired in
a particular area,221 congressional intent to preclude state authority may
be inferred. Finally, state law is preempted to the extent it directly
conflicts with federal law.222 Thus, in determining whether a state law
conflicts with a federal law, a court can ask whether it is impossible to
comply with both the federal and state laws, or whether the state law
interferes with or frustrates congressional intent.223

218. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961) (holding that
"sweeping effect" of Federal Tobacco Inspection Act and its stated goal of providing
national ''unifonn standards" for classification and inspectiQll of tobacco preempted state
attempt to classify tobacco).
219. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Tmnsp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
31 I, 318 (1980) (holding plaintiff's action for tortious interference with contract against
mil carrier preempted by pervasive and comprehensive Interstate Commerce Act);
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
"comprehensiveness and pervasiveness" of the regulatocy scheme under the Federal
Rehabilitation Act preempted plaintiff's cause of action against a federal contractor).
220. Howard, 719 F.2d at 1560 (holding plaintiff's state Jaw cause of action against
a federal contractor for discrimination preempted under the Federal Rehabilitation Act
due in part to the federal government's dominant interest "in determining with whom
and on what conditions it will contract'').
221. While legislative history may express the desire for national unifonnity, see
supra note 215 and accompanying text. courts may infer preemptive intent absent such
an expressed desire. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas
Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 423 (1986) (holding that state regulation of interstate gas pipelines
"disturbs the unifonnity ofthe federal scheme"); Allis-Chalmers CoI]). v. Lueck, 47l
U.S. 202, 211 (1985) (holding that unifonnity and predictability are desirable in labor
contract disputes and thus preempting plaintiff's state cause of action for bad faith under
Federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
222. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Michigan
Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. AWicultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd, 467 U.S. 461,469
(1984) ("[l]fCongress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with federal law.'');
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Cornm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) ("Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
in a specific area, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law.''); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488, 1494-95 (5th Cir.
1990).
223. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991);
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comrn'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,368 (1986); Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 461 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Howard, 719 F.2d at 1555 ("ffJhe touchstone
of pre-emption analysis is Congressional intent.'').
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Although Congress has vested the FDA with jurisdiction over the
regulation of drugs and medical devices, that jurisdiction is not
exclusive. The FDCA expressly provides that its provisions do not
preempt state law unless there is a direct conflict between the two. 224
With the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,225
however, Congress expressly preempted states from enacting laws that
are "different from, or in addition to," federal requirements applicable
to medical devices.226 Thus, while the federal government and the
states, absent a direct conflict, may have concurrent jurisdiction in drug
regulation, state requirements applicable to medical devices are expressly
preempted absent an exemption.227
While the FOIA and the FDCA and its corresponding regulations do
not expressly preempt state discovery laws, to the extent that state courts
or legislatures act in a manner inconsistent with the public interest

224. 21 U.S.C. § 903 provides:
No provision of this subcbapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State,
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
21 u.s.c. § 903 (1994).
225. See supra note 122.
226. 21 U.S.C. § 360k provides:
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no
State or political subdivision ofa State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device u~der this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994); see also Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc,, 672 F. Supp.
907, 909-10 (D.S.C. 1987) (holding that state's common law, to extent it attempts to
regulate matters already addressed by FDA, constitutes a "requirement" within the
meaning of section 360k of the FDCA, and is thus preempted).
227. 21 U.S.C. § 360k provides:
(b) Exempt requirements.
Upon application of a State or political subdivision thereof, the Secretary
may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral
hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions
as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or
political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if(!) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter
which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect
under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in
violation of any applicable Teq:uirernent under 1his chapter.
21 U.S.C. 360k(b).
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concerns manifested by those federal laws, they appear to violate
congressional intent228 A state law prohibiting disclosure of information that federal statutes and regulations make generally available to the
public stands as an obstacle to the efficient operation of the FOIA and
FDCA reporting scheme. Moreover, in enacting the comprehensive
scheme guaranteeing public disclosure of federal agency records under
the FOIA and the FDCA, Congress arguably has "occupied the field"
regarding the disclosure of such information.
The FDA's increasingly comprehensive regulation of the drug and
medical device industry and the "spirit of open government" promoted
by Congress in enacting the FOIA lead to the conclusion that, to the
extent state statutory or common laws prohibit the discovery of selfcritical documents prepared by drug and medical device manufacturers
under the FDCA, such state laws are repugnant to the federal constitution and thus federally preempted.
V.

INAPPLICABILITY OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE TO
DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE MANuFACTURERS

Even if the FOIA public disclosure requirements do not impliedly
preempt application of the self-critical analysis privilege to drug and
medical device product-safety analyses, any attempt to accord that
industry's use of the privilege either with the federal disclosure
requirements or with Wigmore's privileges analysis poses philosophical
dilemmas. Moreover, even without the privilege, the drug and medical
device industry has other strong incentives to conduct candid and
thorough product-safety reviews.
A.

Inapplicability Under the FOIA

Under the FOIA, the drug and medical device industry's desire to
maintain the confidentiality of its product-safety analyses does not
comport with the public's right to access government records. Indeed,
to allow product-safety reviews to remain confidential would undermine
the purpose of the FOIA and the current spirit of open government.
Moreover, the sine qua non of the self-critical analysis privilege is the
need to maintain confidentiality of self-evaluative documents so that fear

228.

See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993).
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of disclosure will not discourage open and frank internal criticism. The
policy underlying this privilege is not satisfied in the drug and medical
device industry when the FDA regulations themselves permit disclosure
under the FOIA mandate.
Furthermore, Congress, in enacting the FOIA exemptions, already
exercised its judgment regarding which categories of information it
believes are entitled to protection. Under Exemption 3 of the FOIA,
which incorporates disclosure prohibitions contained in other federal
statutes, Congress has prohibited. on several occasions, the disclosure of
agency documents that were submitted because required by a governmental agency.229
For example,230 in 1972, Congress enacted the Consumer Product
Safety Act (CPSA),231 which empowered the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) to regulate the safety of consumer products.212
Like the FDA, one of the CPSC's primary functions is to protect the
public's safety.233 Under section lS(b) of the CPSA, a product
manufacturer must report any products that fail to comply with the
consumer product-safety rules and any product defects that could create
a "substantial product hazard."234 At the request of product manufacturers that feared these reports could be divulged to product liability

229. See generally 1 FRANKLJN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.06, at 1-97 to
1-118; 1 O'REILLY, supra note 162, §§ 13.01-13.09, at 13-1 to -25; BRJDGES &
VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 44-52.
230. See also Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat) 643 (codified at IS U,$.C. §§ 1311-14), amended by the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 104(e), 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat) 2572 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1314) (Congress ensured the
confidentiality of documents submitted to the Antitrust Division in response to a civil
investigative demand by specifically exempting such documents from disclosure under
both the FOIA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1343, at 15
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2609-10. A submitter of such documents,
however, could obtain such documents if it subsequently became a defendant in an
antitrust action brought by tbe government Id. Similarly, in the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 13, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(94 Stat) 374, 380-85 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1), Congress prohibited discovery
of documents submitted in response to a civil investigative demand. Other than to
Congress or to federal or state officials, the FTC can only disclose such documents in
adjudicatory proceedings by the FTC or in judicial proceedings to which the FTC is a
party. Id. § 14, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b•
2(d)(l)(c)). See also BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at47-48 for more examples
of federal statutory exemptions under Exemption 3 of the FOIA.
231. Pub. L. No. 92.573, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat.) 1399 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5314-15, 15 u.s.c. §§ 2051-83).
232, See 15 U.S.C. § 2053; see also Frances E. Zollers, The Implementation oftlie

Consumer Product Safety Act Section 6(b) and the Conflict with Freedom ofJnfonnation
Act Policies, 39 ADMJN. L. REV. 61, 62 (1987).
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 205l(b)(l); see also Zollers, supra note 232, at 64.
234.
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litigants through FOIA requests,235 Congress enacted section 6(b)236
with the 1981 amendments to the CPSA.
The purpose of section 6(b) is to safeguard product manufacturers'
reputations from unfair public disclosures by the CPSC of inaccurate or
incomplete information regarding a product.237 Specifically, section
6(b)(5) prohibits the CPSC from releasing any information about a
product from which the public readily could identify a manufacturer or
private labeler unless the CPSC has taken reasonable steps to assure the
accuracy and the fairness of the disclosure under the circumstances and
has given the manufacturer the opportunity to review and respond to the
information.238
Nevertheless, Congress has not created a discovery exemption in either
the FOIA or the FDCA, although it has demonstrated that it knows how.
If drug and medical device manufacturers have a true need for confidentiality of drug and medical device safety analyses, it seems logical that
either Congress or the FDA would address that need. It is unlikely that
Congress will amend the FOIA to protect such information; rather,
Congress has increasingly broadened the disclosure requirements under
the FOIA, while narrowing the exemptions.239 Because disclosure is

235. See Zollers, supra note 232, at 67.
236. Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit 12, subtit. A, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat) 703
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5)).
237. Id.; see also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc,, 447 U.S.
102, 111-13 (1980).
238. See generally Zollers, supra note 232. But section 6(b)'s prohibition against
disclosure does not apply where there is an adjudicative or judicial proceeding
concerning the product, nor does it apply where the CPSC has filed an action against the
product to have it declared an ''imminently hazardous product" See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2055(b)(4)(A)-(B); see also GTE Sylvania, Inc.• 447 U.S. at 122 (holding that section
6(b) sets forth sufficiently definite mandatory conditions precedent to disclosure under
Exemption 3); Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (holding that the nondisclosure requirement of section 6(b) (5) of CPSA is
inapplicable to disclosure "in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding");
Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.RD. 678, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that section
6(b) nondisclosure requirement does not apply to civil discovery requests and refusing
to apply self-critical analysis privilege to communications between manufacturer and
Consumer Product Safety Commission).
239. The 1974 FOIA amendments, in the wake of the Watergate scandal,
considerably narrowed the scope of the law enforcement and national security
exemptions. Again, in 1976, Congress narrowed the FOIA's incorporation of disclosure
prohibitions of other statutes. But in 1986, Congress broadened the exemption for law
enforcement infonnation. See BRIDGES & VILLAGER, supra note 162, at 5-6; I
FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at 1-18 to l-20;see also Zollers,supra
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the predominant objective underlying the FOIA.240 it does not follow
that the public legitimately can be denied access to product-safety
reviews and other self-analytical information submitted to the FDA by
drug and medical device manufacturers.
B.

Inapplicability Under Wigmore :S, Privileges Analysis

Moreover, when Wigmore's classical privileges approach241 is
applied to the self-critical anallsis privilege in the context of the drug
and medical device industry,24 at least three elements of the test fail.
First, a privilege would not exist with respect to FDA-mandated drug
and medical device product-safety analyses because, unlike the medical
peer review setting, manufacturers do not have an expectation of
confidentiality for such reports; rather, the product~safety analyses are
part of the FDA's public files under the FOIA.243 And the FDA is
empowered to make public disclosures of such information upon request.
As one court acknowledged, "[i]t would make little sense to allow
material to be protected from discovery that was not intended to be
protected by those originating it."244 Because the public's interest in
preserving the free flow of self-evaluative information undergirds the
self-critical analysis privilege, there is no foundation for applying the
privilege to materials already in the public domain.
Second, confidentiality of product-safety analyses is not necessary to
maintain the relationship between drug and medical device manufacturers
and the FDA, nor would the ongoing relationship suffer by requiring
continued disclosure of product-safety analyses. Drug and medical
device manufacturers would have difficulty proving that confidentiality
is essential to the full maintenance of their relationship with the FDA,
or that their candor with the FDA, mandated in any event by the FDCA,
would be sufficiently enhanced by making their communications with
note 232, at 77 & n.106.
240. See 1 FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 162, § 1.02, at 1-13.
24l. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; see also McNab, supra note 8,
at 683-84; Flanagan, supra note 20, at 574-75; Bush, supra note 8, at 639-41.
242. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 574-76; McNab, supra note 8, at 683 (arguing
that Wigmore's analysis of privileges does not support recognition of the self-critical
analysis privilege). But see Bush, supra note 8, at 639-41 & nn281-83 (rebutting those
arguments).
243. See, e.g., Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D.
Mich. 1986) (refusing to apply self-critical analysis privilege to investigative analysis
because it was not "performed with the expectation that the analysis {would] remain
confidential" and had not been kept confidential); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D.
703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding privilege waived by failing to treat self-evaluative
report as confidential).
244. Peterson, 112 F.R.D, at 363.
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that agency-communications that traditionally have been subject to
broad public disclosure requirements-----now privileged.245
By virtue of being an FDA-regulated industry, drug and medical
device manufacturers must provide complete and accurate disclosures
regarding the safety and effectiveness of their J>roducts or face serious
civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance.2 It is only by agreeing
to comply with such disclosure requirements that these manufacturers
have the right tO market their products at all. Indeed, if confidentiality
were crucial to the maintenance of the drug and medical device
industry's relationship with its regulatory agency, either Congress would
have provided for appropriate confidentiality provisions in the FOIA, or
the FDA would have implemented appropriate exemptions in its own
regulations.
While there are no reported FDA cases dealing with the necessity of
confidentiality of product-safety analyses to maintain a reporting
relationship with the FDA, several cases under the analogous CPSA are
instructive on this point. Although product manufacturers subject to
regulation by the CPSC have claimed that their mandatory self-critical
product analyses must be protected to encourage full and frank
communications with the CPSA,247 courts have rejected that premise
as "a bald assumption," noting that ''this recital is never explained nor
demonstrated.''248 Similar to drug and medical device manufacturers
under the FDCA reporting requirements, product manufacturers subject
to the police powers of the CPSC do not have discretion to report safety-

245. See Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653-54 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (refusing to protect from discovery manufacturer's commwiications with Consumer
Product Safety Commission in part because manufacturer did not show that confidentiality was "essential to the full maintenance of the relationship between it and the CPSC or
that [its] full candor with the CPSC ... would be sufficiently enhanced by making its
communications with (the CPSq privileged to outweigh the benefits of the truth seeking
process from disclosure'').
246. See supra note 4.
247. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Ind. Ct App.
1987) ("The need to encourage full and frank disclosure of information to the
government regarding defective products is of crucial importance to the consuming
public. The success of the reporting scheme would be severely undercut ifmanufactur•
ers feared that their frank disclosures might be used against them in lawsuits.") (quoting
Ashley v. Uniden Corp. of Am., Civil No. SA-8~-2383 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 1986)).
248. Scroggins, 506 N.E.2d at 86; see also Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D.
678, 683 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("The court is simply not persuaded by [these} policy
arguments wider the terms of the [CPSAJ.'').
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related information concerning their products. Rather, product manufacturers are required to report such information immediately. Accordingly,
''the incentive (not to violate the law) is the same whether the information is discoverable or not."249
Finally, the fourth prong ofWigm.ore's test-the purported injury that
the relationship would suffer by disclosure must outweigh the benefit of
disclosure-also fails when attempting to apply the privilege to the drug
and medical device industry. Because the FDA plays an increasingly
aggressive role in regulating drugs and devices that affect the health and
safety of the public, the public's interest in the disclosure of submissions
made by drug and medical device manufacturers is undeniably strong.
The FDA's action or inaction in response to submissions involving the
safety and effectiveness of drugs and devices can have immediate and
far-reaching ramifications on the health and safety of the entire nation.
As one district court noted, the strong public interest in safe and
efficacious health-care products is best "fostered under the watchful eye
of public scrutiny-scrutiny effectuated thro?o FDA ... policies of
reporting, inspection, review, and disclosure." 0
Application of the self-critical analysis privilege not only defeats the
strong public policy favoring liberal discovery, but also provides
subterfuge for drug and medical device manufacturers by potentially
allO\ving them to conceal crucial and material evidence regarding their
knowledge of product defects. As emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in
Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc.,251 information regarding a
manufacrurer's safety procedures and its response to a particular safety
risk is invaluable to a litigant trying to prove that injuries were caused
by the manufacturer's negligence.252 Applying a discovery privilege
to such product-safety reviews would serve as "a nearly insurmountable
barrier" for a products liability plaintiff who must prove malice to
recover punitive damages.253 Crucial information a manufacturer's
product-safety reviews will reveal includes whether the manufacturer
lmew of the safety hazard, whether it regarded the safety risk as serio\]s
or dangerous, whether it attempted to remedy the problem swiftly and
effectively, and whether it maliciously or fraudulently concealed its
knowledge of the safety hazards of its products.254

249.
250.

251.
252.
253.
2S4.
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Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 683.
Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 597-98 (D, Minn. 1993),
971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992),
Id. at 427.

Id.
Id.
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Applying the self-critical analysis privilege to product-safety analyses
could "threaten□ the public health and safety by posing formidable
obstacles to the search for truth" in drug and medical device litigation.255 The privilege not only defeats the strong public policy favoring liberal discovery, but it aiso provides possible subterfuge for drug
and medical device manufacturers wishing to conceal crucial and
material evidence regarding their knowledge of product-safety concerns.
As Justice Brandeis once poignantly observed, "[s]unlight is ... the best
disinfectant."256
Thus, tested by the foregoing analysis, application of the self-critical
analysis privilege to bar discovery of communications between the FDA
and drug and medical device manufacturers related to the safety of their
products does not appear justified.

C.

Other Incentives for Candid and Thorough Product-Safety
Analys~ by Dmg and Medical Device Manufacturers

The suggested policy consideration underlying the self-critical analysis
privilege-that the production of self-analytical studies and reports
would hamper honest, candid self-evaluative efforts geared toward the
improvement of product safety and the prevention of future product
detects-is unpersuasive when applied to the drug and medical device
industry. It is unlikely that, absent the privilege, drug and medical
device manufacturers, charged with the safety and well-being of their
consumers, would hesitate to evaluate the safety of their products with
candor and thoroughness. Rather, the industry has other strong
incentives to investigate thoroughly and continually the safety and
effectiveness of its products, the most important of which is the desire
to avoid products liability exposure with its concomitant threat of
substantial punitive damages awards in today's highly litigious society.257

255. Eli Lilly&. Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J.,
dissenting).
256. Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., CIV. A. No. 916716, 1992 WL 97822, at *3
(E,D. Pa. Mays. 1992) (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 Q933)).
257. See generally Taylor, supra note 13, at 775-78 & nn.25-35 (1993) (discussing
reality of large punitive damages awards, often many times the size of compensatory
dwages awards, due to infomiation gathered during product-safety reviews); Owen,
supra note 2 J.
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As the Ninth Circuit in Dowling wisely noted, simply because safety
reviews may be discoverable does not mean that such reviews will be
curtailed.:rn Manufacturers have many incentives to conduct productsafety reviews, and "[t]he most prominent of these is surely the desire
to avoid law suits [sic] arising from unsafe conditions."259 A related
incentive for conducting ongoing product-safety reviews is to maintain
one's reputation in the marketplace.260
The Dowling court heeded the Supreme Court's warning that
privileges should be "strictly construed"261 and refused to extend the
self-critical analysis privilege to a corporation's routine internal preaccident safety reviews, noting those reviews "are designed to preempt
litigation."262 The court declared that it would be "perverse to assume
that the candid assessments necessary to prevent accidents will be
inhibited by the fear that they could later be used as a weapon in
hypothetical litigation they are supposed to prevent."263
Moreover, even in the absence of confidentiality assurances, it is
unlikely that safety analyses and investigations will be stifled in an
industry traditionally regulated by a federal agency that is committed to
policing the health and safety of the public. It is unreasonable to assume
that a drug or medical device manufacturer, aware that its product poses
a health or safety risk, would misrepresent the hazard to the FDA and
lmowingly continue to market the drug or device264 while facing civil
and criminal penalties, including substantial :fines, product seizure,
withdrawal of marketing approval, product recall, or imprisonment.265
These incentives alone outweigh any harm that could result from
disclosure.
Additionally, protective orders limiting discovery to litigation purposes
will reduce the "chilling effect" of disclosing sensitive business
information.266 And the evidentiary prohibition against admitting
258. 971 F.2d at 426.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950)); see supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text
262. See also Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co,, 865 P.2d 893,
898 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to apply privilege to pre-accident safety review in
wrongful death action).
263. Dowling, 911 F.2d at 427.
264. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Uniden Corp., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. CL App. 1987)
("We believe that a responsible manufacturer who discovered a dangerous article and
filed a self-critical analysis reflecting the danger, would cease distribution of it .•. ,"),
265. See discussion supra note 4.
266. Federa1 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c} gives the courts broad discretion for
"good cause shown" to impose protective orders ''to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including an order
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subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or other culpable
conduct:267 will provide drug and medical device manufacturers with
protection for post-accident investigations at trial.

VI.

CONCLUSION

While there is merit underlying the public policy arguments in favor
of a self-critical analysis privilege to protect comp'a.nies required by law
to engage in self-evaluation, this discovery privilege should not be
available to protect product-safety analyses submitted to the FDA by
drug and medical device manufacturers.
Under the FOIA, with a few enumerated exceptions, the public is
provided a broad statutory right of access to governmental agency files.
Thirty years after its enactment, the FOIA remains a viable and valuable
means of public access to governmental information. In light of the prodisclosure atmosphere of modem government and in view of the
Supreme Court's warning that courts should not exercise their privilegemaking authority "expansively,''268 courts should not apply the selfcritical analysis privilege as a bar to discovering information submitted
to the FDA by the drug and medical device industry, absent further
direction from Congress. Although it may be somewhat unfair to require
that drug and medical device manufacturers produce to a litigant "self-

that trade secrets or other confidential commercial information ''not be revealed or be
revealed only in a designated way." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7). But see Culinary Foods,
fnc. v. Raychem Corp., !SI F.R.D. 297, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding claim that
information will be hannful to a party's reputation not "good cause" for purposes of
protective order); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F,RD. 573, 576-77, rev'd on
other grounds, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding when infonnation may be
embarrassing and incriminating, that alone is insufficient to bar public disclosure). The
infonnation subject to a protective order, however, still may be obtainable under the
FOIA if it does not fall within one of the nine exemptions.
267. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made an event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event This rule does not require exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment
FED. R. Evm. 407.
268. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
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damning'' documents that the FDA has required them to prepare,269
Congress itself has decided that policy issue, and it is not for the courts
or state legislatures to second-guess that determination.
Moreover, even without the confidentiality afforded by the self-critical
analysis privilege, drug and medical device manufacturers have strong
incentives to perform their FDA-mandated product-safety analyses in a
candid and thorough manner. Accordingly, the strong public policy of
promoting public health and safety will not be thwarted if the privilege
is inapplicable to protect these product-safety analyses.

269.
1992).
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Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F2d 423, 426-27 (9th Cir.

